DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE
Plaintiff – Appellee,        
v.
KAREN MARIE KLINE, Pro Se,
Defendant – Appellant,

CROCKER, LTD., AMERICAN GENERAL
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
AND MANHATTAN CONDOMINIUM UNIT
OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION,
Defendants – Appellees,

KAREN MARIE KLINE, Pro Se,
Petitoner-in-Redemption – Appellant,

RICHARD B. GREEN,



                                                 







TABLE OF CONTENTS

COVER   .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .  .     .     .     .    1

TABLE OF CONTENTS     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .    .     .     .     2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .   3-4

DISPOSITION OF THE COURT BELOW BEING APPEALED   .     .     .  4

STATEMENT REGARDING RELATED APPEALS    .     .     .     .     .     .4

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.     .     .     .     .     .     .  .     .      .    4-5

STANDARD OF REVIEW .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .      .     .       .     .  6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.     .     .     .     .     .     .     .   .     .     .    .  6-10

SUMMARY ARGUMENT – ISSUE I.     .     .     .     .     .     .      .     .     10-17

ISSUE II        .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .      .     .     .   17-20

ISSUE III   .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .       .     .     .      21-26

ISSUE IV    .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .       .     .     .     26-28

ISSUE V     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .       .     .     .     28-30

ISSUE VI     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .       .     .     .    30-31

ISSUE  VII  .    .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .       .     .     .      31-34

ISSUE VIII  .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .        .     .     .    35-37

ISSUE IX    .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .  .     .     .    37-38

CONCLUSION  .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .         .     .     .   38-39

DEPOSIT FOR REDEMPTION UNDER STATUTE 39-5-18    .  .     .    . 41-43

The recording device I used in citing references from the transcript CDs was my
Toshiba Satellite M45-S359 Laptop computer, using the FTR Gold Player Plus
program.

Requests for Relief are in the last paragraph of each issue.

Standard of review in each issue is red so I can tell where I have it; the pain from
snapping something in my back has made all the pain in my stomach muscles and
diaphragm come back, making it so hard to stay focused. This is from losing tone
in my muscles that should have protected the bones in my back, from not being
able to sleep and walk because of the stress.





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases – U.S. Supreme Court
Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1042   . . . . ..  34
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   . . . 21
Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 96 U.S. 627, 637, 24 S. L. ed. 858, 862 . . .   .  . .34
Boerne, 521 U.S., at 532     . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 25
Garrett, 531 U.S.   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  23
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 . . . .  . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Hibbs, 538 U.S., at 737  . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   . .   . .24
Jones v. Flowers, U.S. Supreme Court, April 26, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 36
Kimel, 528 U.S., at 86    . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ..  . .25
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)   . . 6, 9, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 35
Cases – New Mexico
Chavez v. County of Valencia, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974)   . . . . . . . .  15
Dyer v. Pacheco, 98 N.M. 670, 651 P.2d 1314 (Ct. Appl. 1982)  . . .. . . . . . . .   20
Gengler v. Phelps, 89 N.M. 793, 558 P.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1976)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
HSBC Bank v. Fenton, Opinion Number: 2005-NMCA-138 . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 19, 31
Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 91 N.M. 455 (NM S.Ct. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . .  6, 15
Ortega v. Vigil, 22 N.M. 18, 158 P. 487 (1916)   . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .20
Credit vs. Williamson, 107 N.M. 212, 755 P.2d 56 ( S.Ct.1988) . . . 13, 16, 29, 33
Shumate v. Hillis, 80 N.M. 308, 454 P.2d 965 (1969  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Speckner v. Riebold, 86 NM 275, 523 P.2d 10 (1974)  . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
State v. Duran, 107 NM 603, 762 P.2d 890  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Western Bank v. Fluid Assets Dev. Corp., 111 N.M. 458,
Cases - Other
Action Realty & Invs., Inc. v. Grandison, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D786
Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
Beneficial Delaware, Inc. v. Lena Waples, Delware Superior Court,
Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 11 L. ed. 143    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Calasa v. Greenwell, 2 Haw. App. 395, 398, 633 P.2d 553, 555 (1981)    . . .  . 27
Citicorp Savings v. First Chicago Trust Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 293 (1995)   . . 6, 31
Clay v. Horton Mfg. Co., 172 Wis. 2d 349, 353-54,
Craft v. Storey, 1997 CO Court of Appeals,
Delahay v. Clement, 4 Ill. 201    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … .. . … . . . . . . . . . .  . . . 33
Deluxe Motel, Inc. v. Patel, 770 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)   . . . 31, 32
Fortier v. Dona Ana Plaza Partner, 747 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1984)  . . . .  . . .  15
Frahn v. Greyling Realization Corp., 239 Ala. 580, 583,
Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 31 F.3d 1020  . . . . . . . . . .15
Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto Dealers’ Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581  . . . .  . . . . . .18
Indian River Farms v. YBF Partners, 777 So. 2d 1096, 1099
In re Calder, 907 F.2d 569  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
International Savings and Loan Assoc., Ltd. v. Abelardo   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
John Stepp, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, . 379 So. 2d 384, 386
Kober, 988 S.W.2d at 232  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Parker v. Bain, 68 F.3d 1131  . . .  . . . . . … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .15
Roberts v. C.I.R., 175 F.3d 889  . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Saidi v. Wasko, 687 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
Valley Transit Mix v. Miller 928 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1991)  . . . .  . . .. . . . . . . 15
Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill. 30    . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . … . . . . . …. . . .. . .  33
Ware v. Schintz, 190 Ill. 189, 193, 60 N.E. 67, 69    . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
Winhoven v. United States, 201 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Federal Acts, Statutes, and the Constitution
ADA, Title II - Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II   . . . . . .5, 7, 9, 13, 14, 21,





ADA, Title II, §§12131-12134   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 21
ADA, Title II,42 U.S.C. §12131  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .21, 24, 30
Art. I, §10, of the Constitution of the United States   . . . .  . . . .. . . . .. .. . . . 30 31
Due Process - Amendment 14 of the Constitution . . . . . .  4, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16,
11 U.S.C. § 362      . .. . . …. .. . .  . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .  . 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 29
Automatic Stay .    . . 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 28, 36, 38, 39
28 U.S.C. Part I, Chapter 21 §455 -- §455   . . . . . . . . . . . .   . . .   . . . . . . …. 35
28 U.S.C. Chapter 1§ 35.134   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
28 U.S.C Chapter 1§ 35.107  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
New Mexico Statute
NM Statute 30-26-1. . . . . . . . .   . . . . . . . ..   . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
NM Statute 39-5-18 . . . . . . . . . … . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 31, 33, 41
Other Authorities
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4)    . . . .  . . . .    . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 15
Local Rule 1-304 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. .    . . . . .. . .  . . . . 6
Local Rule 1-306 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   . . . . .  . . . . .    .    . . . . . . . . .6, 9
Local Rule 1-306(G) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . …… . .    .. .   . . . . .. . . . . . .  9
LR8-Form 1 . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . … . . . . .   .    . . . … . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . ..  27
NMRA – Rule 1-005  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    4, 10 12, 14, 16
NMRA – Rule 1-006 . . . . . . . .. . .  . . . .  . . . .  .    . . . . .. . . . . . .. 11, 21, 23, 27
NMRA – Rule 1-007 . . . . . .  . . … . . .. .. . . . .. . .... . . . . . . .    9, 21, 23, 24, 26
NMRA – 60(b)(4); N.M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4)  . . . .  . . . . .... … .. .   . . . .. . . .. .  24
Rule 1-015 NMRA   . . . . . . .  . .  . … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .... . . . . . . . . . .  11
Rule 1-056 NMRA    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Rule 1-059 NMRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
SCRA 1-055  . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . ….. ..   . . . . .. . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .. . . . .. .  17
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973)    . . .  . . . . .26   
Wright, & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862,

DISPOSITION OF THE COURT BELOW BEING APPEALED

This is an appeal of a summary and default judgment of foreclosure, Approval of
Sale, Order Correcting Certificate as to the State of the Record, the Certificate of
Redemption; and against being denied accommodation of my disability and any
hearing on my disability.


There are no related or prior appeals.


ISSUE ONE: Whether the amended complaint served during the automatic stay was
void, and, (B): whether Kline’s due process right under the 14th Amendment to be
served the amended compliant, pursuant to Rule 1-005 NMRA, was denied, and,
(C): whether the violation of this basic due process right and of the stay caused the
foreclosure judgment to be void.






ISSUE TWO: Whether the actions taken by Kline constituted an appearance with
the result that she was not in default for purposes of a default judgment.

ISSUE THREE: Whether foreclosure judgment entered December 15, 2005, and
Approval of Sale March 8, 2006, violated ADA, Title II, by failing to accommodate
Kline’s disability.

ISSUE FOUR: Whether Court acted improperly in entering its Order Approving
Sale when Kline was denied due process under the 14th Amendment: one day notice
of a hearing was insufficient notice, and hearing was held before Kline’s time to
respond to Motion had expired.

ISSUE FIVE: Whether the foreclosure sale held without notice to Kline was a
denial of Kline’s due process rights under the 14th Amendment.

ISSUE SIX: Whether the order approving foreclosure and foreclosure sale and
Certificate of Redemption denied Kline’s right to reinstate her mortgage given she
had wired the money specified by Ocwen and pursuant to paragraph 19 of her
mortgage.

ISSUE SEVEN: Whether Fenton case deprived Kline of her right to redeem as
provided in her mortgage at paragraph 24. (The state legislature has clarified the law
for the protection of mortgagors.) (B): Whether Plaintiff’s failure to attach to the
complaint the mortgage with the redemption right and Kline’s signature invalidates
the summary and/or default judgment.

ISSUE EIGHT: Whether an appearance of partiality given by the First Judicial
District Court in this case, possibly related to Kline suing the First Judicial District
Court in Federal Court for discrimination under the ADA, Title II, invalidates its
Judgments and Orders.

ISSUE NINE: Whether Kline’s lawyer, Tami Schnieder, prejudiced Kline by falsely
writing Kline had been served the amended complaint before her bankruptcy and
Kline was incompetent; by not returning Kline’s calls, by quitting in the middle of a
continued hearing and by failing to support with evidence her argument that the sales
price was too low to be valid.

The issues were preserved at trial, but there was no trial or any hearing prior to the
December 15, 2005 entry of Default Judgment. And by motions to Reconsider, later.







  STATEMENT OF THE CASE: SHOWING DATES THINGS TOOK PLACE

Original action was complaint for foreclosure filed March 9, 2005 [RP 1]. Appellant
Kline, as defendant, was served March 18, 2005 [RP 62]. Amended complaint was
filed March 16, 2005 [RP 27]. Kline (I) filed bankruptcy March 21, 2005. I and
others were served the amended complaint March 29, 2005 [RP 64, 66, 68, 70] in
patent violation of the automatic stay. Suggestion of Bankruptcy Relief, filed July
13, 2005 [RP 80] shows bankruptcy existed.

July 25, 2005, Answer and Cross Claim of Manhattan Condominium Unit Owners’
Association (hereinafter “Association”) was filed [RP 84]. Summons was issued to
Crocker, Ltd. [RP 99] and American General Financial [RP 102]; service was July
27, 2005 [RP 105, 108].

Filed August 5, 2005, were Motion for Summary Judgment and Application for
Entry of Stipulated Judgment and Default Judgment with Certificate of Service
showing I was not served [RP 126], Memorandum in Support [RP 111], Affidavit
[RP 130, 132], Certificate of Service and Notice Pursuant to Local Rule 1-304 and
1-306 [RP 134], and Certificate as to the State of the Record [RP 136], citing only
the Amended Complaint.

On October 5, 2005, I filed to excuse the Honorable Timothy Garcia [RP 147].

On October 24, 2005, I filed an answer stating factual disputes [RP 149].





On November 4, 2005, I filed Motion for Accommodation under the ADA, Title II,
[RP 152] with Neuropsychological Evaluation done for the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation.

On December 15, 2005, without any hearing, despite factual disputes, Summary
Judgment, Stipulated Judgment, Default Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure, Order of
Sale and Appointment of Special Master were entered [RP 160] relying on the
Certificate of the Record [136] citing Amended Complaint, but failing to mention it’s
service on March 29, 2005, violated the stay [RP 64, 66, 68, 70]. None was served
on me.

December 28, 2005, Notice of Sale on Foreclosure filed [RP 168] without notice to
me.

On January 3, 2006, unaware of Foreclosure Judgment and Order of Sale, I filed
Request for Additional Extension [RP 171] because my computer which I’d
replaced in November was still not working and I need it to compensate for my
mental disability. Later Deutsche filed Certificate of Mailing [RP 172].

On January 27, 2006, without notice to me, Foreclosure Sale was held.

February 7, 2006, I filed Request for Hearing on Objections to Order Approving
Sale and to Foreclosure Judgment [RP 208].

February 9, 2006, Affidavit of Juliane Hope, my listing agent, was filed [RP 212].

February 14, 2006, I filed Petition for Certificate and Order of Redemption [RP
219] asking Court pursuant to NM Statute 39-5-18, to determine amount needed to
redeem [RP 219]; and Summonses were issued [RP 221, 223]; returns were filed
February 23, 2006 [RP 288, 290].

February 17, 2006 I filed Correction to Objection to Approval of Sale and
Foreclosure Judgment [RP 223] again thinking the Approval had already taken place.

February 21, 2006, I filed Motion for Mandatory Damages for Willful Violation of
the Automatic Stay [RP 238]

On February 23, 2006, I filed asking the court to Determine the Amount Validly
Due on Liens on Property at 729 W. Manhattan Unit #3 [RP 269].





On February 24, 2006, Deutsche filed Reply [RP 292] to Kline’s Objection, Motion
for Approval of Order Confirming Special Master’s Report and Approving
Foreclosure Sale [RP 296], and Request for Hearing on Motion for Order
Approving Special Master’s Report and Confirming Foreclosure Sale [RP 303].

February 24, 2006, I filed 2nd request for hearing on my Objection to Order
Approving Sale [RP 325] and 3rd [RP 326].

February 27, 2006, clerks refused my cashier’s check deposit of $128,250 per NM
Statute 39-5-18, see check at [RP 534, 540, 543]. I filed Correction to Total for List
of Liens Shown in My Petition to the Court to Determine the Sum Validly Due on
Claimant’s Liens on the Property at 729 W. Manhattan, Unit #3 [RP 332] and
Notice of Letter of Intent to Make Offer to Purchase 729 W. Manhattan, Unit 3 on
or before February 28, 2006 and Indicating the Urgency of Having my Redemption
Allowed [RP 336].

February 28, 2006, Ocwen, where I paid my mortgage, said to wire arrears and
costs and they’d reinstate per paragraph 19. So $16,023.72 was wired next day,
March 1. Wire instructions [RP440].

March 2, 2006 Notice of Hearing set for March 8, 2006, 10:00a.m. on Leverick’s
Motion for Order Approving Special Master’s Report and Confirming Foreclosure
Sale, filed [RP 357].

March 7, 2006, 11:25a.m. Notice of Hearing at 10:00 March 8, 2006, delivered to
me.

March 8, 2006, hearing was held on Leverick’s Motion for Order Approving Special
Master’s Report and Confirming Foreclosure Sale. See tapes/CDs.

March 13, 2006, Agnes Samora, Adult Protective Services, picked up CD [RP 439].

March 16, 2006, I filed Motion to Reconsider Order Approving Foreclosure and
Foreclosure Sale and to Set Aside Foreclosure Judgment [RP 440]. Thereafter I
hired Schneider.

May 5, 2006, she appeared for me but quit at 4:59:21 after the hearing was
continued.

May 8, 2006, I filed Answer to Tami Schneider’s Motion to Withdraw.

On May 9, 2006, I appeared pro se at the hearing.





May 12, 2006 I filed my Motion Asking the Court to Provide Copy of Original
Certificate as to the State of the Record [RP 823].

June 1, 2006 another lawyer entered appearance for me [RP 837] but couldn’t say
what day I had to answer to avoid default and had no idea, he said, about ADA,
Title II. He wrote copious emails rather than reading Tennessee v. Lane, and said I
couldn’t fire him. I had to file Motion to Terminate [RP 864] before he let me fire
him; two days later, he withdraw [RP 865].

At June 20, 2006 redemption hearing, I read aloud from and filed, “This is what I
needed to read at the hearing, but was not allowed to read in full. This needs to be
part of the record.” [RP 887]. My oral motion requesting a hearing on my disability
to determine how much additional time I should have had was denied but Court
would not sign order so it could not be filed. The court entered for the opposition
[RP 867, 869, 872, 878, 881, 884].

On June 30, 2006, I filed Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Amended and
Restated Redemption Petition of Richard B. Green and Order Denying Oral Motion
for Hearing on Disability to Determine what Accommodation Is Needed Pursuant to
the ADA, Title II [RP 900]. I thought reconsideration of accommodation would be
denied by operation of law after 30 days and making up for the judge refusing to
sign the order. But the appeal deadline came up.

July 20, 2006, I filed Notice of Appeal [RP 912].

July 21, 2006, Deutsche filed Reply to Defendant Karen Marie Kline’s Response to
Reply by Plaintiff to the Motion to Reconsider Order [RP 924].

August 7, 2006, I filed “Deutsche Bank’s Reply to Response to Reply Exceeds
Provisions of Rule 1-007.1 and LR1-306(G) and on This Account Must Be
Stricken” [RP 934].

August 8, 2006, I filed Request for Hearing pursuant to LR1-306(G) [RP 937]. For
anyone with loss of working memory and processing speed 306(G) is very hard to
follow. A modification like that in federal courts for pro se parties is needed, and,
lawyers should be obliged to follow 306(G) the way pro se parties are. I have a
letter from Petra Jimenez Maes returning my papers in an earlier case, Exhibit 1,





because I didn’t follow 306(G). Now she’s a Justice in N.M. Supreme Court. Was
she wrong when she made it imperative for me to follow 306(G). Or are judges
abusing discretion when they do not enforce it among lawyers today?

On August 15, 2006 First Judicial Court filed [RP 960] saying, “We are unable to
set a hearing on the above-mentioned matter because this Court no longer has
jurisdiction while the case is on appeal.” Hilarious! This is the same old response,
“No,” but dressed up in words.

On August 17, 2006, I filed Corrections to Notice of Appeal [RP 961], and later,
Corrections to Corrections to Notice of Appeal [RP 964]; August 18, 2006, I filed
Correction to Certificate of Service for Corrections to Corrections to Notice of
Appeal [RP 969].


ISSUE I. The Court improperly entered Judgment of Foreclosure [RP 160] because
I nor any party was validly served the Amended Complaint. I filed Chapter 13 on
March 21, 2005, as shown by Exhibit 1 referenced on p.1 of “Correction to
Objection to Approval of Sale and Foreclosure Judgment” [RP 223]. Stay was not
lifted prior to service of the Amended Complaint on March 29, 2005 [RP 64, 66,
68, 70]. Rule 1-005 NMRA provides that all papers be served on each party.
Failure to serve me denied me due process under the 14th Amendment. Amended
Complaint served during my bankruptcy [RP 64, 66, 68, 70] was void because it
violated 11 U.S.C §362. It didn’t confer jurisdiction.

My Motion for Mandatory Damages for Willful Violation of Stay [RP 238], filed
February 21, 2006, said the Amended Complaint was served during my bankruptcy.
I cited Rule 1-005 NMRA requiring every pleading subsequent to original complaint
be served on each party unless they are in default for failure to appear. I wrote, p.2,
“I was waiting for papers to be served at a time when it didn’t violate the Automatic
stay,” and, “Leverick did not serve,” and asked, “Did he not serve me because he
wanted me not to know about the proceedings? It would





appear so, and that shows bad faith.” I said I relied on Rule 1-015 NMRA which
gives 10 days from service of amended complaint to answer. Exhibit shows
bankruptcy filed March 21, 2005.

On March 7, 2006, 11:25 a.m. Notice of Hearing at 10:00 a.m. March 8, 2006, on
Leverick’s Motion for Order Approving Special Master’s Report and Confirming
Foreclosure Sale, filed at [RP 357] was delivered to me. Rule 1-006 NMRA says
notice shall be served no later than 5 days before hearing. So, on March 8, 2006,
because of my disability and the trauma of no hearing or notice before foreclosure
judgment and sale, and so little notice of the instant hearing I didn’t fully understand
what it was about. I showed my confusion by thanking Judge Vigil for saying he was
glad I made it, 10:11:06. Such thanks after notice so short I’d called his chambers
crying showed I was confused, just as my stammering showed my disability. I knew
I needed my bankruptcy because of my 1997 experience, but in confusion I
withdrew my motion to reopen my bankruptcy, writing:


At 10:11:25, March 8, I said there was service of the other parties after bankruptcy
but I was wrong. At 10:22:17 Leverick failed to correct me by saying that no one
was served after my bankruptcy. Leverick was too tricky for me to follow at the
hearing. I listened to the CD over ten times to grasp his lies: at 10:22:32 Leverick
said the Complaint was filed March 5, 2005; in fact it was filed March 9, 2005 [RP
1]; at 10:22:40 Leverick lied, “We got notification through the bankruptcy center
that the Chapter 13 had been filed on March 23rd 2005 which was after the date we
had served her with the Amended Complaint.”  In fact my Chapter 13 which was
filed March 21, 2005, see Exhibit 1 referenced p.1 of “Correction to Objection to
Approval of Sale and Foreclosure Judgment” [RP 223] and amended complaint was
served March 29, 2005 [RP 64, 66, 68, 70] in patent violation of the





automatic stay. I could not grasp on March 8, 2006, what Leverick speciously said
at 10:22:53:


By law I had 30 days to answer from service of Complaint on March 18, 2005 [RP
62].  I was not in default on March 29, 2005 [RP 66] when Amended Complaint
was served in violation of stay and making it invalid to bring parties before the court.
It was served to no one at any other time. Leverick used my misunderstanding and
disability to cover up that he served the Amended Complaint in violation of 11 U.S.
C §362. And, he lied. The Record shows that he lied.

I couldn’t grasp how sale was confirmed after I wired money to reinstate 10:17:25,
wire instructions at [RP 440]; despite saying at 10:17:54 I’d tried to deposit
$128,250; and saying, 10:18:51 that Association liens exceeded what’s authorized by
the Condominium Act. That night I realized what the hearing was, why I needed the
bankruptcy court and why Green had Hope call me to be sure I came, so I wouldn’t
lose my rights, he said, according to Hope. In reality he needed me for an illusion of
due process. That’s why Judge Vigil was glad to see me.

March 13, 2006, Agnes Samora, Adult Protective Services, picked up the CD for
me [RP 439] but it didn’t work where it was taken to be transcribed so I still  
couldn’t see what happened.

The fact is that the Certificate as to the Record [RP 136] did not show my
bankruptcy nor that the Amended Complaint was served in violation of the stay;
therefore it could not validly show when my Answer was due for purposes of
default. I asked Judge Vigil at 10:41:32, March 8, 2006, how he counted to get 30
days; he said he didn’t have to answer. When I repeated all the dates, slowly by
reading my Brief [RP 804] on May 9, 2006, Leverick said at 1:17:19, that the Clerk





of the Court would not be able to know about this. But Leverick prepared the
Certificate, so once again he’s lying because he had a duty to make “this” known.
When Leverick recounts the case he’s not honest and I object at 1:36:04, but the
Court lets him go on and when he admits he and his office made a mistake with the
Certificate, the Court immediately says, “Okay,” and with extreme prejudice
changed the Certificate [RP 878] to benefit Green and deprive me of my property
with denial of due process. The change did not however improve the validity of
service to the necessary parties who were added in violation of the automatic stay
on March 29, 2005.

Purdy argued, March 8, 2006 at 10:28:26 that despite my filed answer, which he
noted Leverick had said I had not filed, there was no obligation to serve me in light
of Prudential Credit vs. Williamson, 107 N.M. 212, 755 P.2d 56 ( S.Ct.1988).
However, the case is inapposite since Williamson consented to foreclosure while I
had no papers served on me after March 29, 2005 when the Amended Complaint
was served in violation of 11 USC §362.

At 10:34:19 on March 8, 2006, I said the Amended Complaint was served March
29. At 10:34:45 I said, “that rule provides all papers be served on me,” and at 10:35:
07 I said I was given a specific time by the rules to answer but Mr. Leverick refused
to, I stammer because of my disability, then say, “serve me that and I believe he did
that specifically knowing that it would um, with my disability that I would be un...
likely to catch it and make make...appropriate.. without having it…” I am unable to
talk clearly. (Contrast this to when I read on May 9.) At 10:36:31 Judge Vigil
interrupted, saying he understands. However when he talks about my mental
disabilities 10:37:48 and says at 10:37:51 “which are confirmed, there’s even a
medical report in here that confirms those, he goes on to say at 10:37:57, with
extreme prejudice and discrimination, “there are no provisions that would grant you
any more leeway than anyone else, unless you have counsel that would request
extensions of time in order to be able to appropriately respond.” The fact is I filed
for extensions, which the Record shows [RP 152, 171]. At 10:38:43 he admitted
that I am capable but have not always met time constraints yet he does not apply
ADA, Title II.





Since the medical report is attached to my Motion for Accommodation under the
ADA, Title II in which I cite Tennessee v. Lane, to say there are no provisions is
abuse of discretion. He said at 10:37:15 that he reviewed “all the pleadings and
rulings and court orders and motions that were filed,” so it’s plainly unreasonable to
say, 10:41:23, “Your version of what occurred is not accurate and not supported by
the record.” The fact is, the Amended Complaint was served on March 29, 2005, in
violation of the automatic stay; when Leverick said otherwise he was lying. At 10:39:
12 and 10:39:29 sale was approved. I got sick on the way home and was sick for
hours.

On May 5, 2006, the lawyer I hired mouthed Leverick’s statement of the case as
opposed to the truth which I had repeatedly brought to her attention, even during the
hearing at 4:39:38.

May 9, 2006, I who hadn’t seen other parties’ pleadings because Schneider kept
them (and still won’t give me even papers I’d copied), appeared pro se. At 1:09:15
the Court wrongly said my answer to Schneider’s motion supported her. Not so, in
#10, I’d written, “I wrote that the Amended Complaint was served while I was in
Chapter 13 and showed it to Ms. Schneider during the hearing. She whispered no,
that I’d been served the Amended Complaint before I was in bankruptcy. She is
wrong, confusing the date of service of the Complaint, March 18, 2005, with the
date of service of the Amended Complaint, March 29, 2005. This is in the record.”


I said at the March 8, 2005 hearing at 10:34:07 that I was relying on that rule (1-
005) and the specific time it gives me to answer but Leverick refused to serve me
that (the Amended Complaint). That was critical.







I was waiting for the Amended Complaint so I could claim damages caused by
Association and I said this March 8, 2007, 10:11:25. Failure by Plaintiff to validly
serve me and necessary parties the Amended Complaint [RP 64, 66, 68, 70] after
stay was lifted meant he proceeded in effective secret from me, shown by my shock
as described by Juliane Hope in affidavit filed on February 9, 2006 [RP 212]. No
papers subsequent to the Complaint came to me until after Green told Hope, his co-
worker, that he owned my condo. In view of Leverick’s lies, any rational person
must question the truth of any doc of his, like [RP 134] saying papers were mailed.

11 U.S.C. Section 362. Automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Provide
for stay of all actions by a creditor against a debtor. The automatic stay stops all
collections efforts, all foreclosure actions. . . Any action after the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy is null and void unless the stay is lifted prior to the action.



Leverick admitted at 10:23:21 on March 8th that the amended complaint was
brought before the court “to add the additional parties to deal with their claims and
their interest in the property.” This was prohibited by the stay.

“Court actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void and without effect.”
Roberts v. C.I.R., 175 F.3d 889; Parker v. Bain, 68 F.3d 1131; Franklin Sav. Ass’n





v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 31 F.3d 1020. “Actions taken in violation of stay are
void rather than merely voidable,” 11 U.S.C.A. §362(a) – Hillis Motors, Inc. v.
Hawaii Auto Dealers’ Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581. “Ordinarily, any action taken in
violation of stay is void and without effect, even where there is no actual notice of
existence of stay,” In re Calder, 907 F.2d 569. This goes to the abuse of discretion
standard of review.

There being abundant case law re the stay, I clearly had adequate reason to believe
the Amended Complaint would be validly served and I would then be required to
answer.



In my case there was no hearing before foreclosure judgment and sale. I trusted
Rule 1-005 and counted on the amended complaint being served when it was not in
violation of 11 USC §362, but it wasn’t and I had no notice foreclosure was
proceeding. The cross or counter claim I wanted to file was an objection, but I was
given no opportunity to object because no valid copy of the Amended Complaint
was served, making Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 apply, "The
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." If due
process is truly a basic right of Americans, then I should not have to be repeating
and effectively shouting this. A mere whisper should have been enough. But on June
20, 2006, after I overcame the Court’s stated problem of my “version” not being
supported by the record, the court objected to my use of bankruptcy to get more
time, 1:48:17, failing to say I had to since I was not given accommodation, and
entered with abuse of discretion for the opposition [RP 867, 869, 872, 878, 881,
884].





Foreclosure Judgment was improper on voidness grounds and must be set
aside/vacated as a matter of law; there is no discretion to do otherwise. The
Amended Complaint was served in violation of the stay and Leverick knew this or
he would not have lied; he knew that by not serving me he could foreclose in secret
from me. It was improper for the court to enter a judgment, either in December
2005 [RP 160] or March 2006 [RP 385] when there was no jurisdiction over
necessary parties added in the Amended Complaint served in violation of the stay. I
must be fully restored.

ISSUE II. The Court improperly entered Default Judgment [RP 160] against Kline
because Kline’s actions constituted an appearance and therefore she was not in
default for purposes of a default judgment. SCRA 1-055 provides for the procedure
for default decrees. Provides default is not permissible upon answer of defendant.

On May 5, 2006, 4:19:39, Schneider says of default procedure after an answer, that
abundant case law states “court needs to look at the record to figure out what did
and didn’t happen and there is no record that there was ever a hearing; there is no
record that there was ever notice of a hearing.” The Court says, 4:20:04, “That’s
the problem when we change judges in midstream here, I mean I don’t know what
thought process he went through.”

But the point is that it’s not a matter of unverifiable thought process; it’s a matter of
the Record and the Record shows no hearing, nor notice of hearing despite the
questions of fact I had in my Answer [RP 149] about the actual amount Deutsche
Bank was entitled to, the Association’s claims and despite raising the question of
violation of the automatic stay. “To fend off summary judgment, the alleged factual
dispute must concern a fact that affects the resolution of the controversy,” See Clay
v. Horton Mfg. Co., 172 Wis. 2d 349, 353-54, 493 N.W.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1992).
At 4:20:26, the Court says, “The appropriate procedure would have been for notice
being given to Ms. Kline that the Default Judgment was being entered and then a
hearing held…” But at 4:20:47 the Court appears to look for wiggle room for the
Plaintiff, “I don’t know even if Judge Sanchez would come and





testify that he – that he read her answer and found that it had no merit, whether that
allows you to skip the procedure of notification. Is there any case law on that that
anyone has?”

Schneider replies, 4:21:21, “The Courts consistently hold that you’re entitled to your
notice and it’s cited in the pleadings.” At 4:21:36 she says, “If you look at,” the
Court coughs, “the original application for default judgment, look at the certification,
Ms. Kline was never… on the mailing list for that original application… look at the
certification on the notice of foreclosure sale that was entered in December, she was
never on the notice… there was no notice for that.” The Court interrupts, 4:22:03
“Well now normally that wouldn’t be required if you’ve been defaulted out, you’re
out.” (The standard of review is abuse of discretion.)

The point, however, is that I answered. I was not in default. Schneider says, 4:22:10
“Actually, there’s a Jones v. Flowers which just came down from… by the U.S.
Supreme Court on April 26th, says it is required.” The Court argues, 4:22:18, “Out!
How can it be required? If they filed no answer, let’s assume there was no
answer.”     Such an assumption is unreasonable.

Schneider says, 4:22:46, “In this case the plaintiff knew my client wasn’t served
because they didn’t... It’s not even in their certification. They knew they weren’t
even serving her with the application for default.” Leverick jumps in 4:22:59, “We
weren’t required to serve her with the application.” The Court leads Leverick, 4:23:
05, “Your position is you’re not required to give her notice because the clerk had
issued the certificate of non-appearance.” At 4:23:13 Leverick follows as the Court
has led and at 4:23:52, Leverick falsely says, “The plaintiff wasn’t responsible for
Ms. Kline’s failure to timely file an answer.”

The fact is that plaintiff was responsible because by serving the Amended Complaint
in violation of the stay the plaintiff caused me to wait for valid service. And,
Leverick knew this or he would not have lied on March 8. See Issue I.

The bankruptcy court docket shows I knew about the foreclosure proceedings and
intended to appear. (I made a copy of it and presented it in court on May 9, 2006,





1:13:58.) I excused Judge Garcia [RP 147], filed an answer on October 24, 2005
[RP 149], and I asked for accommodation [RP 152]. These facts show that I
intended to appear and was not in default when default judgment was entered
without any hearing [RP 160].

On May 9, 2006, I read, citing a case that is shown in the NMRA book for this
point,


I filed Chapter 13 to pay creditors; clearly I would appear and fight for my $150,000
+ equity. I read, “Certificate as to the State of the Record fails to account for
bankruptcy/automatic stay.” I asked the Court to read the Certificate [RP 136]
because I couldn’t get a copy since the file was in chambers. The Court read it and
after Leverick asked the Court to change it, said, “Okay,” at 1:39:34. So at [RP
878] the Certificate was changed so it wouldn’t show the amended complaint; which
did nothing to improve its invalid service on the necessary parties.

Because I read my Brief [RP 804] which stated all the dates I’d stated on March 8
at which time the Court had said my “version” wasn’t “supported by the record,” I
couldn’t be confused that I’d said them wrong and Leverick had to agree with them.
But the Court failed to change its March 8th Orders even though on March 8th it
gave as its reason that my version wasn’t supported by the record. The court
stopped me reading my brief, 1:31:33, then let Hayes who had no standing in the
foreclosure present argument, prejudicial to my case, 1:38:17.

Because the Court said on May 5 that I was “out of the running” for redemption, I
had an order [RP 820] for the clerks to release my deposit ready because I was
paying $7,500 interest to include $250/wk which Fenton made a waste. (Previously
my Realtor, Holman, wanted me to let my home be sold, rather than file
bankruptcy. He kept saying I could redeem. So it is only by the grace of





God and federal law that I kept my home, and now this horror threatens that. This
unremitting trauma/stress hurts my health. Marmot’s Status Syndrome shows that
stress kills.

My cashiers check attached at [RP 534, 540, 543] and wire instructions attached at
[RP 440] show there was no prejudice to plaintiff. My right to claim against the
Association was denied by the Amended Complaint’s [RP 64, 66, 68, 70] invalid
service, but I still answered [RP 149]. The Association’s liens basic to Green
redeeming would not have survived if tried on merits. Note: my Amended Third
Party Complaints in cases D-101-CV-200400390 and D-101-CV-200400619,
naming the Association. Both were dismissed, the Court said, because the Third
Parties were not a part of the action. Clearly I wanted adjudication and here the
parties should have been in the action. I made effective appearance even after
Amended Complaint’s void service [RP 64, 66, 68, 70] so foreclosure Judgment,
Approval of Sale, and Redemption must be set aside as a matter of law.

        I filed motion to set aside on March 16, 2006, less than a year later. Despite
my answer and effective appearance the court entered for the opposition [RP 867,
869, 872, 878, 881, 884].

State v. Duran, 107 NM 603, 762 P.2d 890, at p 608-609 “to establish a due
process violation, and thus reversible error, the defendant must demonstrate
prejudice.” My bankruptcy showed I intended to fight for my equity, so did
excusing Judge Garcia and answering. Two prejudices are that I spent $5,000 on my
property after it had been foreclosed and sold without notice to me, another was
losing $150,000+ in equity. The due process violation is reversible error. To remedy
this, I must be made whole with proceeds from my condo equaling those I would
have received had the court not discriminated against me and denied me due process.






ISSUE III. Foreclosure judgment entered December 15, 2005 [RP 160] was
improper for violation of ADA, Title II, by failing to provide accommodation of my
disability [RP 152].

Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II, mandates accommodation. I will
copiously quote because Judge Vigil said with discrimination and abuse of discretion,
on March 8, 2006, 10:37:57, “there are no provisions that would grant you any
more leeway than anyone else,”:


And, the regulations say:



For me to have been afforded meaningful opportunity to be heard my disability had
to be accommodated with added time. Failure to hear my motion under the ADA,
Title II for accommodation [RP 152] and entering Foreclosure Judgment [RP 160]
relying on Certificate of Record [RP 136] showing no time added to accommodate
my disability discriminated against me. Setting March 8, 2006 hearing 2 days before
my 14 days to answer under Rule 1-007.1(D) NMRA plus 3 days for mailing under
Rule 1-006(D) expired denied me due process, and it could be reasonably foreseen
that with my disability I would be unable to address the denial.





These were obstacles that had to be removed to afford me accessibility and full
participation in the judicial proceedings, and as such violated the Due Process
Clause and discriminated against me.

The operative thing is the Court’s determined discrimination visible March 8, when I
was unable to talk clearly and the Judge interrupted, 10:36: 31, saying he
understood. He spoke of my disabilities 10:37:48 saying, 10:37:51, “which are
confirmed, there’s even a medical report in here that confirms those.” But with
extreme prejudice and discrimination said, 10:37:57, “there are no provisions that
would grant you any more leeway than anyone else, unless you have counsel that
would request extensions of time in order to be able to appropriately respond.” The
fact is I did that [RP 152, 171]. The medical report is attached to my Motion for
Accommodation under the ADA, Title II [RP 152]. In it I cite the law and
Tennessee v. Lane, so to say there are no provisions is unreasonable and an abuse
of discretion. Listen to the CDs and compare when I try to talk on March 8, to me
reading on May 9 what I was able to write. The difference shows my disability. I
used to be able to talk the way I now can write with additional time, and read; I had
my Neuropsychological Evaluation showing my loss of process speed and working
memory attached to my Motion for Accommodation [RP 152].