COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO



DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE
Plaintiff – Appellee,        
v.
KAREN MARIE KLINE, Pro Se,
Defendant – Appellant,

CROCKER, LTD., AMERICAN GENERAL
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
AND MANHATTAN CONDOMINIUM UNIT
OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION,
Defendants – Appellees,

KAREN MARIE KLINE, Pro Se,
Petitoner-in-Redemption – Appellant,

RICHARD B. GREEN,
Purchaser; Cross- and Counter-Petitioner-in-Redemption – Appellee.



    COURT OF APPEALS NO:  26930
    DISTRICT COURT NO:   D-0101-CV-2005-00515



    APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
    THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VIGIL, PRESIDING



                                                



         (with additional four pages of exhibit and what clerks refused to file on
    February 27, 2006 when I came to them wanting to deposit my cashier’s
    check for $128,250. And, showing the colors I had to use to keep the
    issues straight because of my disability making it too confusing otherwise.)




TABLE OF CONTENTS

COVER   .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .  .     .     .     .    1

TABLE OF CONTENTS     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .    .     .     .     2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .   3-4

DISPOSITION OF THE COURT BELOW BEING APPEALED   .     .     .  4

STATEMENT REGARDING RELATED APPEALS    .     .     .     .     .     .4

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.     .     .     .     .     .     .  .     .      .    4-5

STANDARD OF REVIEW .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .      .     .       .     .  6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.     .     .     .     .     .     .     .   .     .     .    .  6-10

SUMMARY ARGUMENT – ISSUE I.     .     .     .     .     .     .      .     .     10-17

ISSUE II        .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .      .     .     .   17-20

ISSUE III   .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .       .     .     .      21-26

ISSUE IV    .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .       .     .     .     26-28

ISSUE V     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .       .     .     .     28-30

ISSUE VI     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .       .     .     .    30-31

ISSUE  VII  .    .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .       .     .     .      31-34

ISSUE VIII  .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .        .     .     .    35-37

ISSUE IX    .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .  .     .     .    37-38

CONCLUSION  .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .     .         .     .     .   38-39

DEPOSIT FOR REDEMPTION UNDER STATUTE 39-5-18    .  .     .    . 41-43

The recording device I used in citing references from the transcript CDs was my
Toshiba Satellite M45-S359 Laptop computer, using the FTR Gold Player Plus
program.

Requests for Relief are in the last paragraph of each issue.

Standard of review in each issue is red so I can tell where I have it; the pain from
snapping something in my back has made all the pain in my stomach muscles and
diaphragm come back, making it so hard to stay focused. This is from losing tone
in my muscles that should have protected the bones in my back, from not being
able to sleep and walk because of the stress.





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases – U.S. Supreme Court
Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 41 L. ed. 93, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1042   . . . . .. 34
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   . . . 21
Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 96 U.S. 627, 637, 24 S. L. ed. 858, 862 . . .   .  . .34
Boerne, 521 U.S., at 532     . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 25
Garrett, 531 U.S.   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  23
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 . . . .  . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Hibbs, 538 U.S., at 737  . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   . .   . .24
Jones v. Flowers, U.S. Supreme Court, April 26, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18, 36
Kimel, 528 U.S., at 86    . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ..  . .25
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
70 S.Ct. 652, (1950)   . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 27, 29
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)   . .6, 9, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 35
Cases – New Mexico
Chavez v. County of Valencia, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974) . . . . . . . .  15
Dyer v. Pacheco, 98 N.M. 670, 651 P.2d 1314 (Ct. Appl. 1982). . .. . . . . . . .   20
Gengler v. Phelps, 89 N.M. 793, 558 P.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
HSBC Bank v. Fenton, Opinion Number: 2005-NMCA-138  . . . . . . . . . . 5, 19, 31
Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 91 N.M. 455 (NM S.Ct. 1977)  . . . . . . . . . .  6, 15
Ortega v. Vigil, 22 N.M. 18, 158 P. 487 (1916)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .20
Credit vs. Williamson, 107 N.M. 212, 755 P.2d 56 ( S.Ct.1988) . . . 13, 16, 29, 33
Shumate v. Hillis, 80 N.M. 308, 454 P.2d 965 (1969  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Speckner v. Riebold, 86 NM 275, 523 P.2d 10 (1974)  . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
State v. Duran, 107 NM 603, 762 P.2d 890  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Western Bank v. Fluid Assets Dev. Corp., 111 N.M. 458,
806 P.2d 1048 (1991)   . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . 28
Cases - Other
Action Realty & Invs., Inc. v. Grandison, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D786
(Fla. 4th DCA, 2006)  . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
Beneficial Delaware, Inc. v. Lena Waples, Delware Superior Court,
July 3, 2006   . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .   30
Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 11 L. ed. 143    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Calasa v. Greenwell, 2 Haw. App. 395, 398, 633 P.2d 553, 555 (1981)    . . .  . 27
Citicorp Savings v. First Chicago Trust Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 293 (1995)   . . 6, 31
Clay v. Horton Mfg. Co., 172 Wis. 2d 349, 353-54,
493 N.W.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
Craft v. Storey, 1997 CO Court of Appeals,
resting on Plute and Osborn Hardware  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   33
Delahay v. Clement, 4 Ill. 201    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … .. . … . . . . . . . . . .  . . . 33
Deluxe Motel, Inc. v. Patel, 770 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)   . . . 31, 32
Fortier v. Dona Ana Plaza Partner, 747 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1984)  . . . .  . . .  15
Frahn v. Greyling Realization Corp., 239 Ala. 580, 583,
195 So. 758, 761 (1940) . . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   14
Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 31 F.3d 1020  . . . . . . . . . .15
Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto Dealers’ Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581  . . . .  . . . . . .18
Indian River Farms v. YBF Partners, 777 So. 2d 1096, 1099
(Fla. 4th DCA 2001)   . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
In re Calder, 907 F.2d 569  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
International Savings and Loan Assoc., Ltd. v. Abelardo   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
John Stepp, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, . 379 So. 2d 384, 386
(Fla. 4th DCA 1980)   . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   32
Kober, 988 S.W.2d at 232  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Parker v. Bain, 68 F.3d 1131  . . .  . . . . . … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .15
Roberts v. C.I.R., 175 F.3d 889  . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Saidi v. Wasko, 687 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
Valley Transit Mix v. Miller 928 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1991)  . . . .  . . .. . . . . . . 15
Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill. 30    . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . … . . . . . …. . . .. . .  33
Ware v. Schintz, 190 Ill. 189, 193, 60 N.E. 67, 69    . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
Winhoven v. United States, 201 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Federal Acts, Statutes, and the Constitution
ADA, Title II - Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II  . . . . . .5, 7, 9, 13, 14, 21,





. . . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . .  .. . . .. . . . . . 22, 23, 25, 26, 30, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39
ADA, Title II, §§12131-12134   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 21
ADA, Title II,42 U.S.C. §12131  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .21, 24, 30
Art. I, §10, of the Constitution of the United States   . . . . . . . .. . . . .. .. . . . 30 31
Due Process - Amendment 14 of the Constitution . . . . . .  4, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16,
. . . . . . . .   20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40   
11 U.S.C. § 362      . .. . . …. .. . .  . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .  . 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 29
Automatic Stay .    . . 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 28, 36, 38, 39
28 U.S.C. Part I, Chapter 21 §455 -- §455   . . . . . . . . . . . .   . . .   . . . . . . …. 35
28 U.S.C. Chapter 1§ 35.134   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
28 U.S.C Chapter 1§ 35.107  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
New Mexico Statute
NM Statute 30-26-1. . . . . . . . .   . . . . . . . ..   . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
NM Statute 39-5-18 . . . . . . . . . … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 31, 33, 41
Other Authorities
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4)    . . . .  . . . .    . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 15
Local Rule 1-304 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. .    . . . . .. . .  . . . . 6
Local Rule 1-306 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   . . . . .  . . . . .    .    . . . . . . . . .6, 9
Local Rule 1-306(G) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . …… . .    .. .   . . . . .. . . . . . .  9
LR8-Form 1 . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . … . . . . .   .    . . . … . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . ..  27
NMRA – Rule 1-005  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4, 10 12, 14, 16
NMRA – Rule 1-006 . . . . . . . .. . .  . . . .  . . . .  .   . . . . .. . . . . . .. 11, 21, 23, 27
NMRA – Rule 1-007 . . . . . .  . . … . . .. .. . . . .. . .... . . . . . . .    9, 21, 23, 24, 26
NMRA – 60(b)(4); N.M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4)  . . . .  . . . . .... … .. .   . . . .. . . .. .  24
Rule 1-015 NMRA   . . . . . . .  . .  . … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .... . . . . . . . . . .  11
Rule 1-056 NMRA    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Rule 1-059 NMRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
SCRA 1-055  . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . ….. ..   . . . . .. . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .. . . . .. .  17
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973)    . . .  . . . . .26   
Wright, & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862,
at 324-25 (2d ed. 1995) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .    27

DISPOSITION OF THE COURT BELOW BEING APPEALED

This is an appeal of a summary and default judgment of foreclosure, Approval of
Sale, Order Correcting Certificate as to the State of the Record, the Certificate of
Redemption; and against being denied accommodation of my disability and any
hearing on my disability.

STATEMENT REGARDING RELATED APPEALS

There are no related or prior appeals.

    ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

ISSUE ONE: Whether the amended complaint served during the automatic stay
was void, and, (B): whether Kline’s due process right under the 14th Amendment
to be served the amended compliant, pursuant to Rule 1-005 NMRA, was denied,
and, (C): whether the violation of this basic due process right and of the stay
caused the foreclosure judgment to be void.






ISSUE TWO: Whether the actions taken by Kline constituted an appearance with
the result that she was not in default for purposes of a default judgment.

ISSUE THREE: Whether foreclosure judgment entered December 15, 2005,
and Approval of Sale March 8, 2006, violated ADA, Title II, by failing to
accommodate Kline’s disability.

ISSUE FOUR: Whether Court acted improperly in entering its Order Approving
Sale when Kline was denied due process under the 14th Amendment: one day
notice of a hearing was insufficient notice, and hearing was held before Kline’s
time to respond to Motion had expired.

ISSUE FIVE: Whether the foreclosure sale held without notice to Kline was a
denial of Kline’s due process rights under the 14th Amendment.

ISSUE SIX: Whether the order approving foreclosure and foreclosure sale and
Certificate of Redemption denied Kline’s right to reinstate her mortgage given
she had wired the money specified by Ocwen and pursuant to paragraph 19 of
her mortgage.

ISSUE SEVEN: Whether Fenton case deprived Kline of her right to redeem as
provided in her mortgage at paragraph 24. (The state legislature has clarified the
law for the protection of mortgagors.) (B): Whether Plaintiff’s failure to attach
to the complaint the mortgage with the redemption right and Kline’s signature
invalidates the summary and/or default judgment.

ISSUE EIGHT: Whether an appearance of partiality given by the First Judicial
District Court in this case, possibly related to Kline suing the First Judicial District
Court in Federal Court for discrimination under the ADA, Title II, invalidates its
Judgments and Orders.

ISSUE NINE: Whether Kline’s lawyer, Tami Schnieder, prejudiced Kline by
falsely writing Kline had been served the amended complaint before her
bankruptcy and Kline was incompetent; by not returning Kline’s calls, by
quitting in the middle of a continued hearing and by failing to support with
evidence her argument that the sales price was too low to be valid.

The issues were preserved at trial, but there was no trial or any hearing prior to the
December 15, 2005 entry of Default Judgment. And by motions to Reconsider, later.






    STANDARD OF REVIEW

           Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 91 N.M. 455 (NM S.Ct. 1977)
    “Judgment which is void cannot be cured by subsequent proceedings.” On
    p 459, “Since the 1973 judgment was void, the 1976 district court was
    required to set it aside pursuant to N.M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4). [§ 21-1-1(60)(b)
    (4) N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Col.1970)]. There is no discretion on the part of
    a district court to set aside a void judgment. Such a judgment may be
    attacked at any time in a direct or collateral action.

         Tennessee v. Lane, “Title II is aimed at the enforcement of a variety of
    basic rights, including the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, that
    call for a standard of judicial review at least as searching, and in some cases
    more searching, than the standard that applies to sex-based classifications.”

         Citicorp Savings v. First Chicago Trust Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 293
    (1995), “On appeal, the reviewing court determined that it would have
    been against the interests of justice for the trial court to have confirmed
    the sale given that Citicorp had represented to the mortgagors that the sale
    would be postponed and that the sale took place by mistake.”

 STATEMENT OF THE CASE: SHOWING DATES THINGS TOOK PLACE

Original action was complaint for foreclosure filed March 9, 2005 [RP 1].
Appellant Kline, as defendant, was served March 18, 2005 [RP 62]. Amended
complaint was filed March 16, 2005 [RP 27]. Kline (I) filed bankruptcy March
21, 2005. I and others were served the amended complaint March 29, 2005
[RP 64, 66, 68, 70] in patent violation of the automatic stay. Suggestion of
Bankruptcy Relief, filed July 13, 2005 [RP 80] shows bankruptcy existed.

July 25, 2005, Answer and Cross Claim of Manhattan Condominium Unit
Owners’ Association (hereinafter “Association”) was filed [RP 84]. Summons
was issued to Crocker, Ltd. [RP 99] and American General Financial [RP 102];
service was July 27, 2005 [RP 105, 108].

Filed August 5, 2005, were Motion for Summary Judgment and Application for
Entry of Stipulated Judgment and Default Judgment with Certificate of Service
showing I was not served [RP 126], Memorandum in Support [RP 111],
Affidavit [RP 130, 132], Certificate of Service and Notice Pursuant to Local
Rule 1-304 and 1-306 [RP 134], and Certificate as to the State of the Record
[RP 136], citing only the Amended Complaint.

On October 5, 2005, I filed to excuse the Honorable Timothy Garcia [RP 147].

On October 24, 2005, I filed an answer stating factual disputes [RP 149].





On November 4, 2005, I filed Motion for Accommodation under the ADA,
Title II, [RP 152] with Neuropsychological Evaluation done for the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation.

On December 15, 2005, without any hearing, despite factual disputes, Summary
Judgment, Stipulated Judgment, Default Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure, Order
of Sale and Appointment of Special Master were entered [RP 160] relying on the
Certificate of the Record [136] citing Amended Complaint, but failing to mention
it’s service on March 29, 2005, violated the stay [RP 64, 66, 68, 70]. None was
served on me.

December 28, 2005, Notice of Sale on Foreclosure filed [RP 168] without notice
to me.

On January 3, 2006, unaware of Foreclosure Judgment and Order of Sale, I filed
Request for Additional Extension [RP 171] because my computer which I’d
replaced in November was still not working and I need it to compensate for my
mental disability. Later Deutsche filed Certificate of Mailing [RP 172].

On January 27, 2006, without notice to me, Foreclosure Sale was held.

February 7, 2006, I filed Request for Hearing on Objections to Order Approving
Sale and to Foreclosure Judgment [RP 208].

February 9, 2006, Affidavit of Juliane Hope, my listing agent, was filed [RP 212].

February 14, 2006, I filed Petition for Certificate and Order of Redemption [RP
219] asking Court pursuant to NM Statute 39-5-18, to determine amount needed
to redeem [RP 219]; and Summonses were issued [RP 221, 223]; returns were
filed February 23, 2006 [RP 288, 290].

February 17, 2006 I filed Correction to Objection to Approval of Sale and Fore-
closure Judgment [RP 223] again thinking the Approval had already taken place.

February 21, 2006, I filed Motion for Mandatory Damages for Willful Violation
of the Automatic Stay [RP 238]

On February 23, 2006, I filed asking the court to Determine the Amount Validly
Due on Liens on Property at 729 W. Manhattan Unit #3 [RP 269].





On February 24, 2006, Deutsche filed Reply [RP 292] to Kline’s Objection,
Motion for Approval of Order Confirming Special Master’s Report and Approving
Foreclosure Sale [RP 296], and Request for Hearing on Motion for Order
Approving Special Master’s Report and Confirming Foreclosure Sale [RP 303].

February 24, 2006, I filed 2nd request for hearing on my Objection to Order
Approving Sale [RP 325] and 3rd [RP 326].

February 27, 2006, clerks refused my cashier’s check deposit of $128,250 per NM
Statute 39-5-18, see check at [RP 534, 540, 543]. I filed Correction to Total for
List of Liens Shown in My Petition to the Court to Determine the Sum Validly
Due on Claimant’s Liens on the Property at 729 W. Manhattan, Unit #3 [RP 332]
and Notice of Letter of Intent to Make Offer to Purchase 729 W. Manhattan,
Unit 3 on or before February 28, 2006 and Indicating the Urgency of Having my
Redemption Allowed [RP 336].

February 28, 2006, Ocwen, where I paid my mortgage, said to wire arrears and
costs and they’d reinstate per paragraph 19. So $16,023.72 was wired next day,
March 1. Wire instructions [RP440].

March 2, 2006 Notice of Hearing set for March 8, 2006, 10:00a.m. on
Leverick’s Motion for Order Approving Special Master’s Report and
Confirming Foreclosure Sale, filed [RP 357].

March 7, 2006, 11:25a.m. Notice of Hearing at 10:00 March 8, 2006, delivered
to me.

March 8, 2006, hearing was held on Leverick’s Motion for Order Approving
Special Master’s Report and Confirming Foreclosure Sale. See tapes/CDs.

March 13, 2006, Agnes Samora, Adult Protective Services, picked up CD [RP 439].

March 16, 2006, I filed Motion to Reconsider Order Approving Foreclosure and
Foreclosure Sale and to Set Aside Foreclosure Judgment [RP 440]. Thereafter I
hired Schneider.

May 5, 2006, she appeared for me but quit at 4:59:21 after the hearing was
continued.

May 8, 2006, I filed Answer to Tami Schneider’s Motion to Withdraw.

On May 9, 2006, I appeared pro se at the hearing.





May 12, 2006 I filed my Motion Asking the Court to Provide Copy of Original
Certificate as to the State of the Record [RP 823].

June 1, 2006 another lawyer entered appearance for me [RP 837] but couldn’t
say what day I had to answer to avoid default and had no idea, he said, about
ADA, Title II. He wrote copious emails rather than reading Tennessee v. Lane,
and said I couldn’t fire him. I had to file Motion to Terminate [RP 864] before
he let me fire him; two days later, he withdraw [RP 865].

At June 20, 2006 redemption hearing, I read aloud from and filed, “This is what
I needed to read at the hearing, but was not allowed to read in full. This needs to
be part of the record.” [RP 887]. My oral motion requesting a hearing on my
disability to determine how much additional time I should have had was denied
but Court would not sign order so it could not be filed. The court entered for
the opposition [RP 867, 869, 872, 878, 881, 884].

On June 30, 2006, I filed Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Amended and
Restated Redemption Petition of Richard B. Green and Order Denying Oral
Motion for Hearing on Disability to Determine what Accommodation Is Needed
Pursuant to the ADA, Title II [RP 900]. I thought reconsideration of
accommodation would be denied by operation of law after 30 days and making
up for the judge refusing to sign the order. But the appeal deadline came up.

July 20, 2006, I filed Notice of Appeal [RP 912].

July 21, 2006, Deutsche filed Reply to Defendant Karen Marie Kline’s Response
to Reply by Plaintiff to the Motion to Reconsider Order [RP 924].

August 7, 2006, I filed “Deutsche Bank’s Reply to Response to Reply Exceeds
Provisions of Rule 1-007.1 and LR1-306(G) and on This Account Must Be
Stricken” [RP 934].

August 8, 2006, I filed Request for Hearing pursuant to LR1-306(G) [RP 937]. For
anyone with loss of working memory and processing speed 306(G) is very hard to
follow. A modification like that in federal courts for pro se parties is needed, and,
lawyers should be obliged to follow 306(G) the way pro se parties are. I have a
letter from Petra Jimenez Maes returning my papers in an earlier case, Exhibit 1,





because I didn’t follow 306(G). Now she’s a Justice in N.M. Supreme Court.
Was she wrong when she made it imperative for me to follow 306(G). Or are
judges abusing discretion when they do not enforce it among lawyers today?

On August 15, 2006 First Judicial Court filed [RP 960] saying, “We are unable
to set a hearing on the above-mentioned matter because this Court no longer
has jurisdiction while the case is on appeal.” Hilarious! This is the same old
response, “No,” but dressed up in words.

On August 17, 2006, I filed Corrections to Notice of Appeal [RP 961], and later,
Corrections to Corrections to Notice of Appeal [RP 964]; August 18, 2006, I
filed Correction to Certificate of Service for Corrections to Corrections to Notice
of Appeal [RP 969].

    SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

ISSUE I. The Court improperly entered Judgment of Foreclosure [RP 160]
because I nor any party was validly served the Amended Complaint. I filed
Chapter 13 on March 21, 2005, as shown by Exhibit 1 referenced on p.1 of
“Correction to Objection to Approval of Sale and Foreclosure Judgment”
[RP 223]. Stay was not lifted prior to service of the Amended Complaint on
March 29, 2005 [RP 64, 66, 68, 70]. Rule 1-005 NMRA provides that all
papers be served on each party. Failure to serve me denied me due process under
the 14th Amendment. Amended Complaint served during my bankruptcy [RP 64,
66, 68, 70] was void because it violated 11 U.S.C §362. It didn’t confer jurisdiction.

My Motion for Mandatory Damages for Willful Violation of Stay [RP 238], filed
February 21, 2006, said the Amended Complaint was served during my
bankruptcy. I cited Rule 1-005 NMRA requiring every pleading subsequent to
original complaint be served on each party unless they are in default for failure to
appear. I wrote, p.2, “I was waiting for papers to be served at a time when it didn’t
violate the Automatic stay,” and, “Leverick did not serve,” and asked, “Did he not
serve me because he wanted me not to know about the proceedings? It would





appear so, and that shows bad faith.” I said I relied on Rule 1-015 NMRA
which gives 10 days from service of amended complaint to answer. Exhibit
shows bankruptcy filed March 21, 2005.

On March 7, 2006, 11:25 a.m. Notice of Hearing at 10:00 a.m. March 8, 2006,
on Leverick’s Motion for Order Approving Special Master’s Report and
Confirming Foreclosure Sale, filed at [RP 357] was delivered to me. Rule 1-006
NMRA says notice shall be served no later than 5 days before hearing. So, on
March 8, 2006, because of my disability and the trauma of no hearing or notice
before foreclosure judgment and sale, and so little notice of the instant hearing I
didn’t fully understand what it was about. I showed my confusion by thanking Judge
Vigil for saying he was glad I made it, 10:11:06. Such thanks after notice so short
I’d called his chambers crying showed I was confused, just as my stammering
showed my disability. I knew I needed my bankruptcy because of my 1997 ex-
perience, but in confusion I withdrew my motion to reopen my bankruptcy, writing:

    “It’s just that because the bankruptcy court always followed the rules it was
    much easier for me in that court than in the state court where they often elect
    not to follow the rules I’m relying on. I don’t understand it so I can’t say
    anymore about it. Except this is so time sensitive I better try one more time
    in the state court,” filed February 21, and mailed February 23, 2006.

At 10:11:25, March 8, I said there was service of the other parties after bankruptcy
but I was wrong. At 10:22:17 Leverick failed to correct me by saying that no one
was served after my bankruptcy. Leverick was too tricky for me to follow at the
hearing. I listened to the CD over ten times to grasp his lies: at 10:22:32 Leverick
said the Complaint was filed March 5, 2005; in fact it was filed March 9, 2005 [RP
1]; at 10:22:40 Leverick lied, “We got notification through the bankruptcy center
that the Chapter 13 had been filed on March 23rd 2005 which was after the date
we had served her with the Amended Complaint.”  In fact my Chapter 13 which
was filed March 21, 2005, see Exhibit 1 referenced p.1 of “Correction to Objection
to Approval of Sale and Foreclosure Judgment” [RP 223] and amended complaint
was served March 29, 2005 [RP 64, 66, 68, 70] in patent violation of the





automatic stay. I could not grasp on March 8, 2006, what Leverick speciously said
at 10:22:53:

    “However under Rules 1-005 subparagraph (A) we’re not required to serve
    her with the Amended Complaint ah if we don’t seek new or additional claims
    against her. Specifically it says, ‘No service need be made on parties in default
    for failure to appear except pleadings that assert new or additional claims for
    relief.’ The Amended Complaint was only brought before the court to add the
    additional parties to deal with their claims and their interest in the property. It
    did not assert a new or additional claim against Ms. Kline and therefore, and
    this has been the practice of this law firm for a long period of time, we were
    not required to serve her with any supplemental pleadings in the case.”  

    By law I had 30 days to answer from service of Complaint on March 18,
    2005 [RP 62].  I was not in default on March 29, 2005 [RP 66] when
    Amended Complaint was served in violation of stay and making it invalid to
    bring parties before the court. It was served to no one at any other time.
    Leverick used my misunderstanding and disability to cover up that he
    served the Amended Complaint in violation of 11 U.S.C §362. And, he
    lied. The Record shows that he lied.

    I couldn’t grasp how sale was confirmed after I wired money to reinstate
    10:17:25, wire instructions at [RP 440]; despite saying at 10:17:54 I’d tried
    to deposit $128,250; and saying, 10:18:51 that Association liens exceeded
    what’s authorized by the Condominium Act. That night I realized what the
    hearing was, why I needed the bankruptcy court and why Green had Hope
    call me to be sure I came, so I wouldn’t lose my rights, he said, according to
    Hope. In reality he needed me for an illusion of due process. That’s why
    Judge Vigil was glad to see me.

    March 13, 2006, Agnes Samora, Adult Protective Services, picked up the
    CD for me [RP 439] but it didn’t work where it was taken to be transcribed
    so I still  couldn’t see what happened.

    The fact is that the Certificate as to the Record [RP 136] did not show my
    bankruptcy nor that the Amended Complaint was served in violation of the
    stay; therefore it could not validly show when my Answer was due for
    purposes of default. I asked Judge Vigil at 10:41:32, March 8, 2006, how he
    counted to get 30 days; he said he didn’t have to answer. When I repeated all
    the dates, slowly by reading my Brief [RP 804] on May 9, 2006, Leverick
    said at 1:17:19, that the Clerk of the Court would not be able to know





    about this. But Leverick prepared the Certificate, so once again he’s lying
    because he had a duty to make “this” known. When Leverick recounts the
    case he’s not honest and I object at 1:36:04, but the Court lets him go on
    and when he admits he and his office made a mistake with the Certificate,
    the Court immediately says, “Okay,” and with extreme prejudice changed
    the Certificate [RP 878] to benefit Green and deprive me of my property
    with denial of due process. The change did not however improve the
    validity of service to the necessary parties who were added in violation of
    the automatic stay on March 29, 2005.

    Purdy argued, March 8, 2006 at 10:28:26 that despite my filed answer,
    which he noted Leverick had said I had not filed, there was no obligation
    to serve me in light of Prudential Credit vs. Williamson, 107 N.M. 212,
    755 P.2d 56 ( S.Ct.1988). However, the case is inapposite since Williamson
    consented to foreclosure while I had no papers served on me after March 29,
    2005 when the Amended Complaint was served in violation of 11 USC §362.

    At 10:34:19 on March 8, 2006, I said the Amended Complaint was served
    March 29. At 10:34:45 I said, “that rule provides all papers be served on
    me,” and at 10:35:07 I said I was given a specific time by the rules to
    answer but Mr. Leverick refused to, I stammer because of my disability,
    then say, “serve me that and I believe he did that specifically knowing that
    it would um, with my disability that I would be un...likely to catch it and
    make make...appropriate.. without having it…” I am unable to talk clearly.
    (Contrast this to when I read on May 9.) At 10:36:31 Judge Vigil interrupted,
    saying he understands. However when he talks about my mental disabilities
    10:37:48 and says at 10:37:51 “which are confirmed, there’s even a medical
    report in here that confirms those, he goes on to say at 10:37:57, with extreme
    prejudice and discrimination, “there are no provisions that would grant you
    any more leeway than anyone else, unless you have counsel that would
    request extensions of time in order to be able to appropriately respond.” The
    fact is I filed for extensions, which the Record shows [RP 152, 171]. At
    10:38:43 he admitted that I am capable but have not always met time
    constraints yet he does not apply ADA, Title II.





    Since the medical report is attached to my Motion for Accommodation under
    the ADA, Title II in which I cite Tennessee v. Lane, to say there are no
    provisions is abuse of discretion. He said at 10:37:15 that he reviewed “all
    the pleadings and rulings and court orders and motions that were filed,” so
    it’s plainly unreasonable to say, 10:41:23, “Your version of what occurred is
    not accurate and not supported by the record.” The fact is, the Amended
    Complaint was served on March 29, 2005, in violation of the automatic stay;
    when Leverick said otherwise he was lying. At 10:39:12 and 10:39:29 sale
    was approved. I got sick on the way home and was sick for hours.

    On May 5, 2006, the lawyer I hired mouthed Leverick’s statement of the
    case as opposed to the truth which I had repeatedly brought to her attention,
    even during the hearing at 4:39:38.

    May 9, 2006, I who hadn’t seen other parties’ pleadings because Schneider
    kept them (and still won’t give me even papers I’d copied), appeared pro se.
    At 1:09:15 the Court wrongly said my answer to Schneider’s motion
    supported her. Not so, in #10, I’d written, “I wrote that the Amended
    Complaint was served while I was in Chapter 13 and showed it to Ms.
    Schneider during the hearing. She whispered no, that I’d been served the
    Amended Complaint before I was in bankruptcy. She is wrong, confusing
    the date of service of the Complaint, March 18, 2005, with the date of
    service of the Amended Complaint, March 29, 2005. This is in the record.”

    Frahn v. Greyling Realization Corp., 239 Ala. 580, 583, 195 So. 758, 761
    (1940). The rule that a want of due process, so defined, voids a judgment
    is not redundant with the rule that a want of personal jurisdiction likewise
    voids a judgment, for a person already effectively made a party to litigation
    could, on some critical motion or for some critical proceeding within that
    litigation, be deprived of the 'notice, a hearing according to that notice, and
    a judgment entered in accordance with such notice and hearing,' required by
    the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution, Frahn, supra. See Winhoven v. United States, 201 F.2d 174
    (9th Cir. 1952), Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949).”

    I said at the March 8, 2005 hearing at 10:34:07 that I was relying on
    that rule (1-005) and the specific time it gives me to answer but Leverick
    refused to serve me that (the Amended Complaint). That was critical.






    Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 91 N.M. 455 (NM S.Ct. 1977) Judgment
    which is void cannot be cured by subsequent proceedings.” On page 459,
    Since the 1973 judgment was void, the 1976 district court was required to
    set it aside pursuant to N.M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4). [§ 21-1-1(60)(b)(4),
    N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Col.1970)]. There is no discretion on the part of a
    district court to set aside a void judgment. Such a judgment may be
    attacked at any time in a direct or collateral action.Chavez v. County of
    Valencia, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974) The vacating of the 1973
    judgment was proper.”  This shows the standard of review.

    I was waiting for the Amended Complaint so I could claim damages caused
    by Association and I said this March 8, 2007, 10:11:25. Failure by Plaintiff
    to validly serve me and necessary parties the Amended Complaint [RP 64,
    66, 68, 70] after stay was lifted meant he proceeded in effective secret from
    me, shown by my shock as described by Juliane Hope in affidavit filed on
    February 9, 2006 [RP 212]. No papers subsequent to the Complaint came to
    me until after Green told Hope, his co-worker, that he owned my condo. In
    view of Leverick’s lies, any rational person must question the truth of any
    doc of his, like [RP 134] saying papers were mailed.

    11 U.S.C. Section 362. Automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
    Provide for stay of all actions by a creditor against a debtor. The automatic
    stay stops all collections efforts, all foreclosure actions. . . Any action after
    the filing of the petition in bankruptcy is null and void unless the stay is lifted
    prior to the action.

    Fortier v. Dona Ana Plaza Partner, 747 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1984),
    p 1330, discusses meaning and Congressional purposes of the stay in
    bankruptcy, and outlines that the automatic stay is one of the fundamental
    debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It stops all collection
    efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.

    Valley Transit Mix v. Miller 928 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1991) the stay provisions
    are broad, they not only protect the property of the estate but also prohibit
    “any act to collect… or to recover a claim against the debtor…”

    Leverick admitted at 10:23:21 on March 8th that the amended complaint was
    brought before the court “to add the additional parties to deal with their claims
    and their interest in the property.” This was prohibited by the stay.

    “Court actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void and without
    effect.” Roberts v. C.I.R., 175 F.3d 889; Parker v. Bain, 68 F.3d 1131;





    Franklin Sav.Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 31 F.3d 1020. “Actions
    taken in violation of stay are void rather than merely voidable,” 11 U.S.C.A.
    §362(a) Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto Dealers’ Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581.
    “Ordinarily, any action taken in violation of stay is void and without effect,
    even where there is no actual notice of existence of stay,” In re Calder,
    907 F.2d 569. This goes to the abuse of discretion standard of review.

    There being abundant case law re the stay, I clearly had adequate reason to
    believe the Amended Complaint would be validly served and I would then
    be required to answer.

    Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct.
    652 (1950) An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
    any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
    calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
    pendency of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present their
    objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the
    required information and it must afford a reasonable time for those
    interested to make their appearance.”

    Williamson says of Mullane, “Those cases, however, and others that hold
    notice by publication constitutionally infirm, are cases in which persons
    other than parties to the foreclosure action, having a recorded interest in
    the property, were deprived of that property with absolutely no notice that
    their interests in the property had been foreclosed, and without a hearing
    concerning those interests.”

    In my case there was no hearing before foreclosure judgment and sale. I
    trusted Rule 1-005 and counted on the amended complaint being served
    when it was not in violation of 11 USC §362, but it wasn’t and I had no
    notice foreclosure was proceeding. The cross or counter claim I wanted to
    file was an objection, but I was given no opportunity to object because no
    valid copy of the Amended Complaint was served, making Grannis v.
    Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 apply, "The fundamental requisite of due
    process of law is the opportunity to be heard." If due process is truly a then I
    should not have to be repeating and effectively shouting this. A mere whisper
    should have been enough. But on June 20, 2006, after I overcame the Court’s
    stated problem of my “version” not being supported by the record, the court
    objected to my use of bankruptcy to get more time, 1:48:17, failing to say I
    had to since I was not given accommodation, and entered with abuse of
    discretion for the opposition [RP 867, 869, 872, 878, 881, 884].





    Foreclosure Judgment was improper on voidness grounds and must be set
    aside/vacated as a matter of law; there is no discretion to do otherwise. The
    Amended Complaint was served in violation of the stay and Leverick knew
    this or he would not have lied; he knew that by not serving me he could
    foreclose in secret from me. It was improper for the court to enter a judgment,
    either in December 2005 [RP 160] or March 2006 [RP 385] when there was
    no jurisdiction over necessary parties added in the Amended Complaint served
    in violation of the stay. I must be fully restored.

    ISSUE II. The Court improperly entered Default Judgment [RP 160] against
    Kline because Kline’s actions constituted an appearance and therefore she was
    not in default for purposes of a default judgment. SCRA 1-055 provides for
    the procedure for default decrees. Provides default is not permissible upon
    answer of defendant.

    On May 5, 2006, 4:19:39, Schneider says of default procedure after an
    answer, that abundant case law states “court needs to look at the record to
    figure out what did and didn’t happen and there is no record that there was
    ever a hearing; there is no record that there was ever notice of a hearing.” The
    Court says, 4:20:04, “That’s the problem when we change judges in
    midstream here, I mean I don’t know what thought process he went through.”

    But the point is that it’s not a matter of unverifiable thought process; it’s a
    matter of the Record and the Record shows no hearing, nor notice of hearing
    despite the questions of fact I had in my Answer [RP 149] about the actual
    amount Deutsche Bank was entitled to, the Association’s claims and despite
    raising the question of violation of the automatic stay. “To fend off summary
    judgment, the alleged factual dispute must concern a fact that affects the
    resolution of the controversy,” See Clay v. Horton Mfg. Co., 172 Wis. 2d
    349, 353-54, 493 N.W.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1992). At 4:20:26, the Court says,
    “The appropriate procedure would have been for notice being given to Ms.
    Kline that the Default Judgment was being entered and then a hearing held…”
    But at 4:20:47 the Court appears to look for wiggle room for the Plaintiff, “I
    don’t know even if Judge Sanchez would come and





    testify that he – that he read her answer and found that it had no merit,
    whether that allows you to skip the procedure of notification. Is there any case
    law on that that anyone has?”

    Schneider replies, 4:21:21, “The Courts consistently hold that you’re entitled
    to your notice and it’s cited in the pleadings.” At 4:21:36 she says, “If you look
    at,” the Court coughs, “the original application for default judgment, look at
    the certification, Ms. Kline was never… on the mailing list for that original
    application… look at the certification on the notice of foreclosure sale that was
    entered in December, she was never on the notice… there was no notice for
    that.” The Court interrupts, 4:22:03 “Well now normally that wouldn’t be
    required if you’ve been defaulted out, you’re out.” (The standard of review is
    abuse of discretion.)

    The point, however, is that I answered. I was not in default. Schneider says,
    4:22:10 “Actually, there’s a Jones v. Flowers which just came down from…
    by the U.S. Supreme Court on April 26th, says it is required.” The Court
    argues, 4:22:18, “Out! How can it be required? If they filed no answer, let’s
    assume there was no answer.”     Such an assumption is unreasonable.

    Schneider says, 4:22:46, “In this case the plaintiff knew my client wasn’t
    served because they didn’t... It’s not even in their certification. They knew
    they weren’t even serving her with the application for default.” Leverick
    jumps in 4:22:59, “We weren’t required to serve her with the application.”
    The Court leads Leverick, 4:23:05, “Your position is you’re not required to
    give her notice because the clerk had issued the certificate of non-
    appearance.” At 4:23:13 Leverick follows as the Court has led and at
    4:23:52, Leverick falsely says, “The plaintiff wasn’t responsible for Ms.
    Kline’s failure to timely file an answer.”

    The fact is that plaintiff was responsible because by serving the Amended
    Complaint in violation of the stay the plaintiff caused me to wait for valid
    service. And, Leverick knew this or he would not have lied on March 8. See
    Issue I.

    The bankruptcy court docket shows I knew about the foreclosure proceedings
    and intended to appear. (I made a copy of it and presented it in court on May
    9, 2006,





    1:13:58.) I excused Judge Garcia [RP 147], filed an answer on October 24,
    2005 [RP 149], and I asked for accommodation [RP 152]. These facts show
    that I intended to appear and was not in default when default judgment was
    entered without any hearing [RP 160].

    On May 9, 2006, I read, citing a case that is shown in the NMRA book for
    this point,

    “Stay was lifted on July 1, 2005. (I produce) Copy of Bankruptcy
    Record/Docket pg 5   Note: It shows that I knew and Leverick knew
    I knew about the foreclosure action –“All that is necessary to constitute
    an “appearance” to avoid default judgment without notice, is an
    affirmative act by the party showing knowledge of the suit and intention
    to appear, this affirmative act can be shown by contacts between
    attorneys, by letter from one attorney to the other or where plaintiff’s
    attorney has acquiesced in defendant’s request for more time to answer.”
    Gengler v. Phelps, 89 N.M. 793, 558 P.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1976).”

    I filed Chapter 13 to pay creditors; clearly I would appear and fight for my
    $150,000+ equity. I read, “Certificate as to the State of the Record fails to
    account for bankruptcy/automatic stay.” I asked the Court to read the
    Certificate [RP 136] because I couldn’t get a copy since the file was in
    chambers. The Court read it and after Leverick asked the Court to change it,
    said, “Okay,” at 1:39:34. So at [RP 878] the Certificate was changed so it
    wouldn’t show the amended complaint; which did nothing to improve its
    invalid service on the necessary parties.

    Because I read my Brief [RP 804] which stated all the dates I’d stated
    on March 8 at which time the Court had said my “version” wasn’t “supported
    by the record,” I couldn’t be confused that I’d said them wrong and Leverick
    had to agree with them. But the Court failed to change its March 8th Orders
    even though on March 8th it gave as its reason that my version wasn’t
    supported by the record. The court stopped me reading my brief, 1:31:33, then
    let Hayes who had no standing in the foreclosure present argument, prejudicial
    to my case, 1:38:17.

    Because the Court said on May 5 that I was “out of the running” for
    redemption, I had an order [RP 820] for the clerks to release my deposit ready
    because I was paying $7,500 interest to include $250/wk which Fenton made a
    waste. (Previously my Realtor, Holman, wanted me to let my home be sold,
    rather than file bankruptcy. He kept saying I could redeem. So it is only by the
    grace of





    God and federal law that I kept my home, and now this horror threatens that.
    This unremitting trauma/stress hurts my health. Marmot’s Status Syndrome
    shows that stress kills.

    Dyer v. Pacheco, 98 N.M. 670, 651 P.2d 1314 (Ct. Appl. 1982) “Any doubts
    about whether relief should be granted are resolved in favor of the defaulting
    defendant because default judgments are not favored in the law; in the absence
    of a showing of prejudice to the plaintiff, cases should be tried upon the
    merits.”

    My cashiers check attached at [RP 534, 540, 543] and wire instructions
    attached at [RP 440] show there was no prejudice to plaintiff. My right to
    claim against the Association was denied by the Amended Complaint’s
    [RP 64, 66, 68, 70] invalid service, but I still answered [RP 149]. The
    Association’s liens basic to Green redeeming would not have survived if
    tried on merits. Note: my Amended Third Party Complaints in cases D-101-
    CV-200400390 and D-101-CV-200400619, naming the Association. Both
    were dismissed, the Court said, because the Third Parties were not a part of
    the action. Clearly I wanted adjudication and here the parties should have
    been in the action. I made effective appearance even after Amended
    Complaint’s void service [RP 64, 66, 68, 70] so foreclosure Judgment,
    Approval of Sale, and Redemption must be set aside as a matter of law.

    Ortega v. Vigil, 22 N.M. 18, 158 P. 487 (1916) “Answer filed by
    defendant after time therefore had expired was not a nullity, and so long
    as it remained on file and undisposed of, rendition of default judgment
    constituted an irregularity for which judgment could set aside upon motion
    filed within one year from date of rendition of such judgment.”

    I filed motion to set aside on March 16, 2006, less than a year later. Despite
    my answer and effective appearance the court entered for the opposition [RP
    867, 869, 872, 878, 881, 884].

    State v. Duran, 107 NM 603, 762 P.2d 890, at p 608-609 “to establish a due
    process violation, and thus reversible error, the defendant must demonstrate
    prejudice.” My bankruptcy showed I intended to fight for my equity, so did
    excusing Judge Garcia and answering. Two prejudices are that I spent $5,000
    on my property after it had been foreclosed and sold without notice to me,
    another was losing $150,000+ in equity. The due process violation is reversible
    error. To remedy this, I must be made whole with proceeds from my condo
    equaling those I would have received had the court not discriminated against
    me and denied me due process.






    ISSUE III. Foreclosure judgment entered December 15, 2005 [RP 160] was
    improper for violation of ADA, Title II, by failing to provide accommodation
    of my disability [RP 152].

    Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II, mandates accommodation. I will
    copiously quote because Judge Vigil said with discrimination and abuse of
    discretion, on March 8, 2006, 10:37:57, “there are no provisions that would
    grant you any more leeway than anyone else,”:

    "Title II, §§12131-12134, prohibits any public entity from discriminating
    against “qualified” persons with disabilities in the provision or operation of
    public services, programs, or activities. The Act defines the term “public
    entity” to include state and local governments, as well as their agencies and
    instrumentalities. §12131(1). Persons with disabilities are “qualified” if they,
    “with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the
    removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the
    provision of auxiliary aids and services, mee[t] the essential eligibility
    requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or
    activities provided by a public entity.” §12131(2).”

    And, the regulations say:

    Title 28 – Judicial Administration, Chapter 1 – Sec.  35.107(a) Designation of
    responsible employee. A public entity that employs 50 or more persons shall
    designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and
    carry out its responsibilities under this part, including any investigation of any
    complaint communicated to it alleging its noncompliance with this part or
    alleging any actions that would be prohibited by this part. The public entity
    shall make available to all interested individuals the name, office address, and
    telephone number of the employee or employees designated pursuant to this
    paragraph.

    Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), “The Due Process Clause also
    requires the States to afford certain civil litigants a “meaningful opportunity to
    be heard” by removing obstacles to their full participation in judicial
    proceedings. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).”

    For me to have been afforded meaningful opportunity to be heard my disability
    had to be accommodated with added time. Failure to hear my motion under
    the ADA, Title II for accommodation [RP 152] and entering Foreclosure
    Judgment [RP 160] relying on Certificate of Record [RP 136] showing no time
    added to accommodate my disability discriminated against me. Setting March
    8, 2006 hearing 2 days before my 14 days to answer under Rule 1-007.1(D)
    NMRA plus 3 days for mailing under Rule 1-006(D) expired denied me due
    process, and it could be reasonably foreseen that with my disability I would be
    unable to address the denial.





    These were obstacles that had to be removed to afford me accessibility and
    full participation in the judicial proceedings, and as such violated the Due
    Process Clause and discriminated against me.

    The operative thing is the Court’s determined discrimination visible March
    8, when I was unable to talk clearly and the Judge interrupted, 10:36: 31,
    saying he understood. He spoke of my disabilities 10:37:48 saying, 10:37:51,
    “which are confirmed, there’s even a medical report in here that confirms
    those.” But with extreme prejudice and discrimination said, 10:37:57, “there
    are no provisions that would grant you any more leeway than anyone else,
    unless you have counsel that would request extensions of time in order to be
    able to appropriately respond.” The fact is I did that [RP 152, 171]. The
    medical report is attached to my Motion for Accommodation under the
    ADA, Title II [RP 152]. In it I cite the law and Tennessee v. Lane, so to say
    there are no provisions is unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. Listen to
    the CDs and compare when I try to talk on March 8, to me reading on May
    9 what I was able to write. The difference shows my disability. I used to be
    able to talk the way I now can write with additional time, and read; I had my
    Neuropsychological Evaluation showing my loss of process speed and
    working memory attached to my Motion for Accommodation [RP 152].

    Tennessee v. Lane,It is not difficult to perceive the harm that Title II is
    designed to address. Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive





    unequal treatment in the administration of state services and programs,
    including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights. . . The decisions of
    other courts, too, document a pattern of unequal treatment in the
    administration of a wide range of public services, programs, and activities,
    including the penal system,11 public education,12 and voting.13 Notably,
    these decisions also demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional treatment in
    the administration of justice.14”

    In a pattern of unequal treatment in administration of justice, my motions
    seeking to have denial of due process righted [RP 208, 209, 212, 223, 238,
    269, 325, 326, 328, 332, 336, 371, 440, etc.] were denied; my first motion
    seeking accommodation [RP 152], the removal of barriers to accessibility,
    was ignored, so all things considered the discrimination was egregious.

    Tennessee v. Lane,This pattern of disability discrimination persisted
    despite several federal and state legislative efforts to address it. In the
    deliberations that led up to the enactment of the ADA, Congress identified
    important shortcomings in existing laws that rendered them “inadequate to
    address the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities
    are facing.” S. Rep. No. 101—116, at 18. See also H. R. Rep. No.
    101—485, pt. 2, at 47.15 It also uncovered further evidence of those
    shortcomings, in the form of hundreds of examples of unequal treatment
    of persons with disabilities by States and their political subdivisions. See
    Garrett, 531 U.S., at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also id., at 391 (App.
    C to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting). As the Court’s opinion in Garrett
    observed, the “overwhelming majority” of these examples concerned
    discrimination in the administration of public programs and services. Id.”

    First Judicial Court is public for administration of justice and is required by law
    to accommodate Americans with disabilities, of which I’m one.

    Tennessee v. Lane, “Given the sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the
    nature and extent of unconstitutional discrimination against persons with
    disabilities in the provision of public services, the dissent’s contention that the
    record is insufficient to justify Congress’ exercise of its prophylactic power is
    puzzling, to say the least.”

    It is puzzling that the Court discriminated against me, with my disability, given
    the clear language of Tennessee v. Lane.

    Existing legislation and case law should prevent me losing my condo from
    failure to remove barriers to accessibility and reasonably accommodate my
    disability. But I’ve produced the law repeatedly [RP 152, 208, 209, 212, 223,
    238, 269, 325, 326, 328, 332, 336, 371, 440] yet traumatic denial of my due
    process persists. ARRRRGH, to put it in the vernacular. My constitutional
    right of access to the court was denied! No hearing was held on my motion
    [RP 152] to determine how much added time I needed to answer the
    Complaint because of my disability and no time was added [RP 160]. In fact,
    less time was given to answer Motion for Approval of Order Confirming
    Special Master’s Report [RP 296] than Rules 1-006(D) and 1-007.1(D)
    NMRA say, prior to March 8, 2006 hearing on it. The deprivation ensured my
    confusion and was prejudicial; I came to the hearing failing to apprehend why I
    needed my bankruptcy.

    Tennessee v. Lane, “Congress’ chosen remedy for the pattern of exclusion
    and discrimination described above, Title II’s requirement of program
    accessibility, is congruent and proportional to its object of enforcing the right
    of access to the courts. The unequal treatment of disabled persons in the
    administration of judicial services has a long history, and has persisted despite
    several legislative efforts to remedy the problem of disability discrimination.
    Faced with considerable evidence of the shortcomings of previous legislative
    responses,





    Congress was justified in concluding that this “difficult and intractable
    proble[m]” warranted “added prophylactic measures in response.” Hibbs,
    538 U.S., at 737.”

    First Judicial District Court excluded and discriminated against me by not
    removing obstacles to accessibility for me in two preceding foreclosures, in
    other actions and now. I filed my Neuropsychological Evaluation done
    through Division of Vocational Rehabilitation [RP 152] showing my loss of
    processing speed: in one test I was in the 8th percentile for speed. Despite
    this, disability discrimination deprived me of my condo without opportunity
    to be heard: no accommodation of added time was granted; hearing to
    confirm sale was held with less than 24 hours notice. Certificate as to the
    Record [RP 136] was relied upon on December 15, 2005 for entry of default
    and summary judgment [RP 160] despite my motion for accommodation
    [RP 152]. Record shows no hearing to determine what reasonable accom-
    modation I needed prior to default or summary judgment being entered. My
    motions to reconsider were denied. [RP 208, 209, 223, 440, 900]. The
    motions written and filed by ineffective Schnieder fail to address this critical
    issue. To the point of a legal monopoly, look at Judge Vigil saying on March
    8, 10:37:57, “there are no provisions that would grant you any more leeway
    than anyone else, unless you have counsel that would request extensions of
    time in order to be able to appropriately respond.” I had filed asking for accom-
    modation but he apparently insists such requests must be made by counsel.
    The discrimination is so shocking it is extremely hard to do this appeal.

    Tennessee v. Lane, “The remedy Congress chose is nevertheless a limited
    one. Recognizing that failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will
    often have the same practical effect as outright exclusion, Congress required
    the States to take reasonable measures to remove architectural and other
    barriers to accessibility. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).

       For me short time frames were a barrier to accessibility: March 8 hearing
    was.held before my time to respond under Rule 1-007.1 NMRA to the Motion
    filed February 24, 2006 [RP 296] expired despite my need for reasonable
    accommodation of added time to have due process; no extra time was given





    as shown by the Certificate as to the Record [RP 136], which, bear in
    mind, the Court changed to benefit Green [RP 878] after I pointed out that
    it relied on a doc served in violation of the stay; no hearing was held to
    determine how much added time I needed, showing the court repeatedly
    denied me rights I am entitled to under the Constitution and ADA, Title II.

    Tennessee v. Lane, “It requires only “reasonable modifications” that would
    not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided, and only when
    the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for the service. Ibid.”

       As defendant, I was eligible for “the service”. I had services from the
    Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Additional time is a reasonable
    modification. Certificate of Record [RP 136] shows no added time. The
    record shows no hearing held to determine what added time I needed to
    accommodate my disability in order to “timely” answer the Complaint and
    make my claim against the Association liens. I was not in default when the
    Motion for Default Judgment was not served on me. My Psychological
    Evaluation in the file [RP 152] showed the Court it had a duty to provide
    reasonable modifications to the rules and accommodation.

    Tennessee v. Lane, “This duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent with
    the well-established due process principle that, “within the limits of practic-
    ability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be
    heard” in its courts. Boddie, 401 U.S., at 379 (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted).20 Our cases have recognized a number of affirmative
    obligations that flow from this principle: the duty to waive filing fees in certain
    family-law and criminal cases,21 the duty to provide transcripts to criminal
    defendants seeking review of their convictions,22 and the duty to provide
    counsel to certain criminal defendants.23 Each of these cases makes clear that
    ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a State’s
    failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the courts.
    Judged against this backdrop, Title II’s affirmative obligation to accommodate
    persons with disabilities in the administration of justice cannot be said to be
    “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it can-
    not be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
    behavior.” Boerne, 521 U.S., at 532; Kimel, 528 U.S., at 86.24 It is, rather,
    a reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end.”

    I’ve said all of this repeatedly and been denied my rights. The operative thing
    is the Court’s discrimination, visible March 8 when I was unable to talk
    clearly and he interrupted, 10:36:31, saying he understood. He spoke of my
    mental disabilities 10:37:48 and said, 10:37:51, “which are confirmed, there’s
    even a medical report in here that confirms those.” But with prejudice and
    discrimination went on, 10:37:57, "there are no provisions that would grant





    you any more leeway than anyone else, unless you have counsel that would
    request extensions of time in order to be able to appropriately respond.”
    The fact is I did that [RP 152, 171]. The “medical report” is attached to
    my Motion for Accommodation under the ADA, Title II [RP 152]. In it I
    extensively cite Tennessee v. Lane, so it is discrimination and abuse of
    discretion for the Court to say there are no provisions. On June 20, 2006, the
    court entered for the opposition [RP 867, 869, 872, 878, 881, 884].

    Wherefore, I as a disabled American have a right to reasonable
    accommodation, to “leeway” if you will, and failing that, as was the case, I’ve
    been denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard, so Foreclosure judgment,
    default judgment, summary judgment, stipulated judgment [RP 160], approval
    of sale [RP 385], and certificate of redemption [RP 872] should be set aside as
    improper and/or void for failure to provide a meaningful opportunity to be
    heard and lack of due process. Relief needs to be granted to make me whole
    as if these deprivations had not been entered and carried out against me.

    Tennessee v. Lane,Title II is aimed at the enforcement of a variety of basic
    rights, including the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, that call
    for a standard of judicial review at least as searching, and in some cases more
    searching, than the standard that applies to sex-based classifications.

    ISSUE IV. The court acted improperly in entering its Order Approving Sale
    [RP 385] when Kline was denied due process: one day notice of hearing is
    insufficient, and hearing was held before her time to respond, under Rule 1-
    007.1 (D) NMRA, to the Motion [RP 296] expired.

    11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (1973) “A
    judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous. It is void only if the court
    that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the
    parties, or if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.”

    On February 7, 2005, having seen the proposed order in the court file I
    understood, because of my disability, that the sale was already approved with
    no notice to me, so I filed Objection to Approval of Sale and Foreclosure
    Judgment [RP 209] writing p. 7, “I hope that the Court takes back these
    decisions that were made when I had no chance at all to take part.”






    February 24, 2006, I filed 2nd  request for hearing on my Objection to Order
    Approving Sale [RP 325] and a 3rd [RP 326] because of my disability and the
    stress of N.M.’s woeful legal aid saying redemption ran from the auction so
    February 27 was my last day to redeem. Because LR8-Form 1 asked for
    concurrence: “Concurrence of counsel as to need for hearing: YES_NO_x
    (specify why not) Paralegal said “NO!”.” So I called Leverick and neither he
    nor his paralegal said that they had already that day requested a hearing. Was
    that to ensure I had little notice? Like not serving the Amended Complaint?
    My three requests for hearing [RP 208, 325, 326] were ignored.

    March 7, 2006 at 11:25 a.m. Notice of Hearing set for 10:00 March 8, 2006,
    was delivered to me. Rule 1-006 NMRA says notice of hearing shall be served
    not later than 5 days before the time specified for hearing. I called Judge Vigil’
    s chambers crying, that’s why he said at 10:11:06, March 8, that he was glad I
    made it.

    Here is what was opined in International Savings and Loan Assoc., Ltd. v.
    Abelardo,

    We note, initially, that the alleged defects claimed in Defendants' motion for
    Rule 60(b)(4) relief were not raised during the foreclosure proceeding.
    However, this is excusable under the rule because absent exceptional
    circumstances, there is no time limit on a Rule 60(b)(4) attack on a judgment.
    See Calasa v. Greenwell, 2 Haw. App. 395, 398, 633 P.2d 553, 555 (1981)
    ("Except in exceptional situations, there is no time limit on an attack on a
    judgment as void."); see also 11 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal
    Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862, at 324-25 (2d ed. 1995) (construing the
    corresponding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4) by stating that
    "there is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. . . . A void
    judgment cannot acquire validity because of laches on the part of a judgment
    debtor.")

    Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652,
    94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
    process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
    calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
    pendency of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present their
    objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the
    required information and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested
    to make their appearance.”

       By tactic of short notice Deutsche effectively silenced me with court approval.
I came to court not fully understanding the March 8 hearing, how things were done
in secret from me, Leverick’s lies, and my mistakes that he used to his favor. I





    needed adequate time to prepare: 1.) Michelle Duran, a state worker in
    Department of Adult Protective Services, brought in my mail so I could have
    deposed her and gotten testimony that no envelope came with Leverick’s
    distinctive return address; 2.) I was told Darci Burson, Green’s broker, said
    she called Judge Vigil and he said there was “no way” I’d get the condo back.
    I could have deposed Burson and called for phone records; 3.) I would have
    had a chance to see Leverick served no one except in violation of the stay.
    Without adequate time to prepare I could do none of those things and on June
    20, 2006, the court entered for the opposition [RP 867, 869, 872, 878, 881,
    884].

    The proceedings should not be accorded finality under abuse of discretion
    standard. Order Approving Sale [RP 385] should be set aside and I should be
    granted damages to include rents for time I was deprived of my property, and
    restored as if improper orders were not entered.

    ISSUE V. The foreclosure sale held without notice to Kline violated her due
    process rights.

    “Denial of sufficient service of process raises material issue. Where judgment
    sued on recited sufficient service of process but the defendant denied such
    service, this certainly raised an issue of material fact which could not be
    resolved by taking evidence at a hearing on summary judgment without proof
    by uncontradicted affidavit or deposition.” Shumate v. Hillis, 80 N.M. 308,
    454 P.2d 965 (1969).

    Western Bank v. Fluid Assets Dev. Corp., 111 N.M. 458, 806 P.2d 1048
    (1991), says, “Mortgagee first lienholder could not use the judicial system to
    enforce its rights in a foreclosure proceeding after deliberately failing to serve
    notice upon junior lienholders of record of its intention to hold the foreclosure
    sale, even though the junior lienholders were parties to a lawsuit brought by
    the mortgagee and were entitled to actual notice of the sale.”

    So it must be true that Mortgagee first lienholder can’t use judicial system to
    enforce its rights in foreclosure after deliberately failing to serve me, who paid
    on and cared for the property for most of two decades. Notice of Sale on
    Foreclosure [RP 168] was filed December 28, 2005; it doesn’t show I was
    notified. On January 3, 2006, unaware of Foreclosure Judgment and Order of
    Sale, I filed Request for Additional Extension [RP 171]. After this Deutsche
    filed Certificate of Mailing [RP 172] purporting to show I was mailed to. If the
    Certificate is true, why wasn’t it timely filed? Failing contemporary service it
    looks like it’s as false as Leverick saying on March 8, 2006, 10:22:48 that I
    filed bankruptcy after he served the Amended Complaint. See Issue I.






    My first notice of the sale was when my listing agent said Green said he had
    title to my condo. (Green let me spend money on the condo after he owned it
    until I was considering an offer to purchase. How fair is that?)

    Because my mail was brought in to me by Michelle Duran, a state worker in
    the Dept. of Adult Protective Services, Duran could have been deposed and
    testified in court that no envelope came with Leverick’s distinctive return
    address. See Issue IV.

    It is grossly unjust and demonstrates prejudice to deny my right to know about
    the sale and then not allow me to redeem with the result I lose my property
    because I wasn’t first to file because I didn’t know about the sale. This being
    true, the burden identified in State v. Duran, 107 NM 603, 762 P.2d 890, at p
    608-609 “to establish a due process violation, and thus reversible error, the
    defendant must demonstrate prejudice,” has been satisfied.

    Purdy argued on March 8, 2006 at 10:28:26 that despite my filed answer,
    which he noted Leverick had said I had not filed, there was no obligation to
    serve me in light of Prudential Credit vs. Williamson 107 N.M. 212, 755 P.2d
    56 (S.Ct. 1988). However, the case is inapposite since Williamson consented
    to foreclosure while I had no papers served on me after March 29, 2005 when
    the Amended Complaint was served in violation of 11 USC §362.

    Williamson says of Mullane, 339 U.S. 306, “Those cases, however, and others
    that hold notice by publication constitutionally infirm, are cases in which
    persons other than parties to the foreclosure action, having a recorded interest
    in the property, were deprived of that property with absolutely no notice that
    their interests in the property had been foreclosed, and without a hearing
    concerning those interests.”

    In my case there was no hearing before foreclosure and sale, and given that I
    counted on the amended complaint being served when it was not in violation
    of 11 USC §362, and it never was, I had no notice my property was being
    foreclosed.

    Williamson says, “when a party with a recorded interest in property has been
    properly served and has had actual notice of a complaint in foreclosure, and
    participates in the proceedings to the extent of approving a judgment and
    decree of foreclosure directing sale of the foreclosed property, and thereafter is
    on constructive notice of the time and place of sale, he has received all the due





    process to which he is entitled before being deprived of his interest in the
    property.”

    I agree, I should have been properly served the amended complaint and been
    allowed to participate in the proceedings. But I was not, further, there was no
    hearing and I have a disability and had asked for accommodation to which I
    have a right under the ADA, Title II [RP 152]. At the hearing to confirm the
    sale Judge Vigil said at 10:37:15 that he reviewed “all the pleadings and rulings
    and court orders and motions that were filed.” He denied me accommodation
    saying at 10:37:59, “there are no provisions that would grant you any more
    leeway than anyone else,” which abuses discretion because the ADA, Title II,
    and Tennessee v. Lane specifically say,

    “Persons with disabilities are “qualified” if they, “with or without reasonable
    modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural,
    communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids
    and services, mee[t] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
    services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public
    entity.” §12131(2).”

    See Issue III. I therefore did not receive all the due process to which I am
    entitled before suffering the prejudice of being deprived of my interest in the
    property. Relief must be granted that restores me fully as if the discrimination,
    improper and prejudicial miscarriages of justice had not taken place, to include
    the full equity in my condo as it existed then or setting aside and the means to
    realize my equity as I was able to then even if that means assessing damages.

    ISSUE VI. Order approving foreclosure and foreclosure sale [RP 385] and
    Certificate of Redemption [RP 872] were entered in violation of Kline’s right
    to reinstate her mortgage after she timely wired what Ocwen said was needed
    to reinstate per 19 of mortgage [RP 440].

    Art. I, §10, of the Constitution of the United States prohibits impairment of
    contracts.

    Beneficial Delaware, Inc. v. Lena Waples, Delware Superior Court, July 3,
    2006, “In taking an inflexible approach, Beneficial deprived Waples of the
    right to reinstate, and it breached its obligations. . .” I gave the Court my
    wire instructions which paid through Ocwen all money owed, even costs,
    more than five days before confirmed sale. Copy attached at [RP440].





    Speckner v. Riebold, 86 NM 275, 523 P.2d 10 (1974), at p. 277. “That part
    of the decree of foreclosure that direct the manner and terms of the sale of the
    mortgaged property does not become a final judgment until the judicial
    confirmation of the sale, whereupon it becomes final.”

       Deutsche/Ocwen breached its obligations under 19 by not reinstating and by
    pursuing approval to make sale final under N.M. law.

    Citicorp Savings v. First Chicago Trust Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 293 (1995), “On
    appeal, the reviewing court determined that it would have been against the
    interests of justice for the trial court to have confirmed the sale given that
    Citicorp had represented to the mortgagors that the sale would be postponed
    and that the sale took place by mistake.”

    Ocwen said how much to wire and accepted the wired funds, yet approval of
    sale was effected, and, by lying. See Issue I. The standard of review is abuse
    of discretion. Denial of my right to reinstate was improper, against interests of
    justice; I must be allowed to reinstate and given the means I had when my
    right was denied. Not to fully restore would be unjust.

    ISSUE VII. Fenton case deprived Kline of right to redeem given in her
    mortgage at 24; 24 wasn’t attached to Complaint resulting in factual question
    that needed hearing. Stipulated Judgment of December 15, 2005, did not find
    for the liens [RP 160].

    24. Redemption Period. If this Security Instrument is foreclosed, the
    redemption period after judicial sale shall be one month.”

    Art. I, §10, of the Constitution of the United States prohibits impairment of
    contracts.

    “The right of redemption is the mortgagor's valued and protected equitable
    right to reclaim her estate in foreclosed property.” Deluxe Motel, Inc. v. Patel,
    770 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Saidi v. Wasko, 687 So. 2d 10, 11
    (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Action Realty & Invs., Inc. v. Grandison, 31 Fla. L.
    Weekly D786 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 15, 2006).

    What I experienced, however was that the Court granted no hearing on the
    sum due on liens, and on February 27, 2006, the clerks refused my cashier’s
    check deposit of $128,250.00 per NM Statute 39-5-18, see check at [RP 534,
    540, 543]; I moved in Appeal for the Record to show this and my paperwork
    is attached at end of Corrected Revised Brief. Refusing my deposit and
    paperwork amounted to a violation of NM Statute 30-26-1. Tampering with
    public records, which is a fourth degree felony; the standard of review for this
    should be Fundamental Fairness. Angela Peinado, who clerks said required
    them to refuse my deposit and who was there when it was done, should not
    retain her job and should be prosecuted for breaking the law by tampering with
    the public record. Plus, the clerks told me I had to go see Judge Ortiz, who
    then had to recuse, which the clerks must have known.

    My mortgage gave me a right to redeem that became unenforceable when I
    could not file first for redemption either after the auction I didn’t know about
    or after sale confirmation on March 8, 2006, because the Order [RP 385] was
    given to Green’s lawyer to file and he filed Green’s petition [RP 390] directly
    after. The Record shows no entry between the two. On June 20, 2006 I read
    from a Cornell law  treatise on how if a right has no way to enforce it then due
    process is denied. See, “This is what I needed to read at the hearing,” [RP
    887].

    The Court said on May 5, 2006, that I was “out of the running” to redeem.
    What is shocking is that the CD sounds as if that bit has been taken out:  At 4:
    52:33, the Court said, “There is a, another issue that in reading the applications
    for redemption filed by everybody, heh, ah, summary judgment I guess by Mr.
    Purdy’s client, I’m interested in whether or not based on the responses
    whether summary judgment is not appropriate because there in fact are some
    factual disputes, and I started to look at the redemptions and when they were
    filed and one was filed a few minutes before the actual judgment was entered
    or the order approving the sale, and then there’s…” But the CD sound oddly
    stops here, mid sentence, starting up again on a different note/sound, “If I
    have to decide whether or not that time period…” What happened to the
    Court’s account of the other redemption petitions? Or to its remark that I was
    “out of the running?”

    “This equity of redemption is an estate in land.” Deluxe Motel, Inc., 770 So.
    2d at 284; Saidi, 687 So. 2d at 12; Indian River Farms, 777 So. 2d at 1099;
    John Stepp, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Miami, 379 So. 2d 384,
    386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).

    “[T]he right of redemption is an incident of all mortgages and cannot be
    extinguished except by due process of law.” Indian River Farms, 777 So. 2d





    at 1099; John Stepp, Inc., 379 So. 2d at 386; VOSR Indus., Inc. v. Martin
    Properties, Inc., 919 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

    Williamson also talks about the right of redemption saying it is not divested by
    foreclosure; Williamson stipulated they were unable to redeem; I on the other
    hand could not get the clerks to accept my cashier’s check deposit for
    $128,250.00 pursuant to redemption statute on February 27, 2007, while
    Green was allowed to redeem for $85,000. Most importantly, when
    redemption is reduced to a race, I, because of my disability involving reduction
    in speed, and the ADA, had a right to be clearly told when the race starts, not
    leaving it to happenstance I’ll see a newspaper. So, the ADA standard of
    review applies. See Issue III and Standard of Review.

    Craft v. Storey is a 1997 Colorado Court of Appeals decision resting on Plute
    and Osborn Hardware. Craft holds that an owner (or his or her agent) may
    satisfy liens encumbering the property to eliminate the redemption rights of
    junior lienholders. Craft also addresses the additional question of when the
    owner's ability to satisfy junior liens terminates, “concluding that owners may
    defeat the redemption rights of lienholders by satisfying liens even after the
    lienor has tendered redemption funds, as long as the lien is satisfied before
    expiration of that lienor's redemption period.”

    In my case the clerks would not allow me to deposit my funds, $128,250.00
    (copy of cashier’s check attached at [RP 534, 540, 543]; paperwork attached
    at end of Corrected Revised Brief) which funds were enough to cover all
    unadjudicated liens and interest. Curiously, the Association gave all its false,
    unadjudicated liens to the Association’s director’s alleged real estate agent,
    Green, who was highest bidder at sale about which I had no notice; more
    curious, the Association allowed Green to have back the $5,000 over amount
    owed to Duetsche that he had paid at auction, March 8, 2006, 10:42:00, but
    most curious would be the Association ignoring my $128,250.00 and my
    paperwork: Deposit for Redemption Under Statute 39-5-18 for the Property at
    729 W. Manhattan, Unit #3.

    Ware v. Schintz, 190 Ill. 189, 193, 60 N. E. 67, 69:  “Under the repeated
    rulings of this court a mortgagee, as against the mortgagor, is held, as in
    England, in law, to be the owner of the fee, having the jus in re as well as ad
    rem, and entitled to all the rights and remedies which the law gives to such
    owner, and may, after condition broken, maintain ejectment against the
    mortgagor. The mortgagor or his assignee, however, is the legal owner of the
    mortgaged estate as against all persons, excepting the mortgagee or his
    assignees. Delahay v. Clement, 4 Ill. 201; Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill. 30.”





    I was the mortgagor and owner of the mortgaged condo as against all persons
    except the mortgagee or his assignees.

    Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 11 L. ed. 143, “statute objected to gave
    mortgagor twelve months to redeem after the sale, and Mr. Chief Justice
    Taney said: 'It declares that, although the mortgaged premises should be sold
    under the decree of the court of chancery, yet that the equitable estate of the
    mortgagor shall not be extinguished, but shall continue for twelve months after
    the sale; and it moreover gives a new and like estate, which before had no
    existence, to the judgment creditor, to continue for fifteen months. If such
    rights may be added to the original contract by subsequent legislation, it would
    be difficult to say at what point they must stop . . . Any such modification of a
    contract by subsequent legislation, against the consent of one of the parties,
    unquestionably impairs its obligations, and is prohibited by the Constitution.”

    I as mortgagor had an equitable estate not extinguished until the end of my
    redemption period. But Green was allowed to redeem within minutes of sale
    confirmation. That modified my contractual rights by nearly all of the 30 days.
    Liens for the Association’s legal fees to avoid its duty under the Condominium
    Act were unadjudicated despite my requests [RP 269, 328] and were allowed
    as the basis for Green redeeming. This is against my consent, impairs the
    contractual obligations I relied upon, and is prohibited by the Constitution.

    In Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, it was held that a state statute which
    authorized redemption of property sold in foreclosure of a mortgage, where no
    such right previously existed, or extended the period of redemption beyond the
    time previously allowed, could not apply to a sale under a mortgage executed
    before its passage, and Mr. Justice Shiras, referring to Brine v. Hartford F. Ins.
    Co. 96 U.S. 627, 637, 24 S. L. ed. 858, 862, said:

    'But this court held, through Mr. Justice Miller, that all the laws of a state
    existing at the time a mortgage or any other contract is made, which affect the
    rights of the parties to the contract, enter into and become a part of it, and are
    obligatory on all courts which assume to give a remedy on such contracts, . . .
    that it is therefore said that these laws enter into and become a part of the
    contract'-and that 'the remedy subsisting in a state when and where a contract
    is made and is to be performed is a part of the obligation.' . . .

    At the time my mortgage contract was made I had a right to redeem and it was
    obligatory on all courts which assume to give a remedy on such contracts; the
    remedy at the time the contract was made is a part of the obligation. So the
    Certificate of Redemption was improper and should be set aside and I should
    be fully restored. All relief paragraphs are incorporated here.






    ISSUE VIII. Whether appearance of partiality by First Judicial District Court
    was given when: clerks refused my redemption deposit (see Issue VII); Judge
    Vigil said, 10:37:59, there is “no provision” to give me “more leeway than
    anyone else,” which contradicts the ADA, Title II, and Tennessee v Lane; and
    Judge Vigil said at 10:37:01, after saying my case had “gone through the
    courthouse,” that Judge Sanchez had recused himself because of reassignment
    of cases when the record shows Purchaser Green excused Judge Sanchez [RP
    216]. These things raise a question of impartiality and/or retaliation against me,
    which is prohibited by federal regulation, see Issue III, for my federal suit
    against First Judicial District Court,

    U.S.C. Title 28, Part I, Chapter 21 § 455 -- § 455. Disqualification of justice,
    judge, or magistrate judge. (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
    United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
    impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself
    in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice
    concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
    concerning the proceeding.

    The regulations for the ADA, Title II, say:

    Title 28 – Judicial Administration, Chapter 1 – Department of Justice, Part 35
    Nondiscrimination on the basis of disability in State and Local Government
    Services, Subpart B General Requirements, §35.134 Retaliation or coercion

    (a) No private or public entity shall discriminate against any individual because
    that individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this part, or
    because that individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
    manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the Act or this part.

    On March 8, 2006, when I stammered because of my disability, Judge Vigil
    interrupted, 10:36:31, saying he understood, however when he spoke of my
    mental disabilities 10:37:48 and said at 10:37:51 “which are confirmed, there’s
    even a medical report in here that confirms those,” he prejudicially and with
    discrimination goes on to say at 10:37:57 “there are no provisions that would
    grant you any more leeway than anyone else, unless you have counsel that
    would request extensions of time in order to be able to appropriately respond.”

    The fact is I requested the accommodation of more time [RP 152, 171]. The
    “medical report” is attached to my Motion for Accommodation under the ADA,





    Title II [RP 152] in which I extensively cite Tennessee v. Lane, so the Court is
    in error, abuses its discretion, and shows it is partial to ruling against me to say
    there are no provisions. Significantly Judge Vigil said at 10:37:15 that he
    reviewed “all the pleadings and rulings and court orders and motions that were
    filed.” So, his impartiality must be questioned when he says at 10:41:23, “Your
    version of what occurred is not accurate and not supported by the record.”
    The fact is that the Amended Complaint was served on March 29, 2005 [RP
    66] in violation of the stay and at no other time. That was my “version.” At 10:
    39:12 and 10:39:29 sale was approved, literally making me sick.

    On  May 5, 2006, in a discussion of default procedures required after an
    answer the Court doesn’t accept “abundant case law” at 4:19:39, nor over ten
    minutes later, at 4:22:18, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v.
    Flowers, and the Court makes the startling suggestion, “Let’s assume there
    was no answer.” Standard of review is abuse of discretion.

    The fact is that I answered; to pretend otherwise to my detriment shows
    partiality as does the Court leading Leverick, 4:23:05, “Your position is you’re
    not required to give her notice because the clerk had issued the certificate of
    non-appearance.” Leverick hadn’t said that. Plus, the certificate which failed
    to account for my bankruptcy filed on March 21, and which relied on the
    Amended Complaint served on March 29th, was undoubtedly prepared by
    Leverick. The clerk would more accurately be described as rubber stamping it.
    (see Issue II.) So, it’s shocking but not surprising that on May 9 Judge Vigil
    stopped me reading my brief at 1:31:33, but at 1:38:17 let Hayes present
    argument although Green had no standing in the foreclosure and the argument
    was prejudicial to my case, and said, “Okay,” at 1:39:34, to changing the
    Certificate [RP 878] so that it no longer incorporated the violation of stay.

    Significantly, I was told Judge Vigil told Darci Burson, Green’s broker, there
    was “no way” I would get the condo back. That’s on p. 5, of “This is What I
    Needed to Read at the Hearing, but Was Not Allowed to Read in Full. This
    Needs to be Part of the Record,” filed June 20, 2006. On June 20, 2006 I read
    from a





    Cornell law professor’s treatise on how if a right has no way to enforce it then
    due process is denied. I also made an oral motion requesting a hearing on my
    disability to determine how much additional time I should have been given as
    accommodation of my disability under the ADA, Title II, to answer the
    complaint before I was held in default. The court denied my motion, but
    would not sign the order I provided, so it could not be filed.  I was denied
    opportunity to depose Burson or call for phone records by short notice. Judge
    Vigil denied he spoke to Burson. Such denial would be de rigueur.

    There appearing to be partiality, the judgments should be ruled improper and
    set aside and I should be restored my equity as if these injustices were not
    done.

    ISSUE IX. Kline’s lawyer, Tami Schnieder, prejudiced Kline by falsely writing
    Kline had been served the amended complaint before her bankruptcy and
    Kline was incompetent when in fact Kline has a disability and is entitled to
    accommodation under the ADA, Title II; by not returning Kline’s calls, and by
    quitting in the middle of a continued hearing. See Issue III above.

    Schnieder falsely wrote the substantial error that I was served the Amended
    Complaint before bankruptcy [RP 540, 543, 619, 635] and refused to correct,
    see emails in Memorandum incorporated by reference; so I told her, 4:39:38 at
    the hearing that I was served it while in bankruptcy but she wouldn’t say so;
    she falsely wrote that I’m “incompetent” and would not return my calls. She
    failed to show evidence to support argument that 36% of market value paid by
    Green was too low to be legitimate [RP 619, 635], and cried and quit after she’
    d missed her Rule 59 deadline 4:08:06, 4:10:40, 4:14:43, 4:15:56.

    So, it’s fair to say Schneider’s conduct fell below a reasonable level of
    professional conduct such that I was unfairly prejudiced. This is so because
    Judge Vigil said while ruling against me on May 9, 2006, 2:31:59 – 2:33:19,
    that the argument that the amount paid was too low was compelling, but no
    evidence supported it and so the Court denied setting aside.

    Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) “To uphold a claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must find that counsel’s
    performance was seriously deficient and that the ineffective performance





    resulted in prejudice to the defendant.

    Appellant must overcome the presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate
    assistance, and identify those acts or omissions which do not amount to
    reasonable professional judgment. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

    To establish the prejudice prong, a defendant must show there is a reasonable
    probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
    proceeding would have been different. Kober, 988 S.W.2d at 232.

    Because I lost half my processing speed and working memory, but not my
    level of education, I’m disabled, not incompetent; Schneider’s failure to make
    the legal distinction made her unable to identify central problems in this case
    deriving from me not being afforded adequate time to Answer or prepare for
    the hearing on approval of sale or the May 9th hearing. This resulted in serious
    prejudice to me. See Issue III and the ADA standard of review.

    It was seriously deficient for Schneider to write I’d been served the amended
    complaint before bankruptcy: the record shows service in violation of the stay.
    To speak as Schneider, Leverick and the judge did, prejudiced me and the
    proceedings should not be accorded finality. Relief must include complete
    restoration. If that means awarding damages, then so be it.

       CONCLUSION

    I have nine issues, which is too many for me to remember, so I have to keep
    looking back to see what they are. I can’t remember what I need to say in one,
    if I’ve been in another when I realized I should say it. So I have to have
    different colors to keep straight what my mind kept straight before I had a
    disability. The central issue is deprivation of due process: on its own and as a
    result of deprivation of accommodation to which I have a right under ADA,
    Title II. Appealing is painful because of years I’ve been deprived
    accommodation and the impact that’s had on my life, finances and ability to
    recover from disease; and over those years my credit’s been ruined by the
    Court repeatedly ignoring my need for accommodation and the law which
    mandates it. Keeping straight corrections to this appeal is harder when my
    mind is occupied with not knowing how to pay my October mortgage because





    I've been unlawfully deprived of my condo equity which I worked for to take
    care of myself if this kind of circumstance occurred: a disability. I can’t get an
    equity loan because of the foreclosure resulting from denial of due process and
    accommodation. It’s hard to believe my appeal will meet less discrimination
    and prejudice. Hard, but I persevere in my belief in justice.

    To be made whole I must have all the equity from my condo that was
    available at the end of 2005 to beginning of 2006 when my condo was listed
    for $237,500, in keeping with the market analysis provided by my listing agent,
    but my condo was taken with no accommodation of my disability and on the
    basis of an amended complaint served in violation of the automatic stay (a
    second central issue) and with total disregard of the fact the liens were
    unadjudicated and made false claims. I should be recompensed for lost rents
    over the time I was deprived of my condo, and for the pain caused by the
    Court accepting Leverick’s lies on March 8, 2006, and not reconsidering its
    Order on May 9 when I showed that my “version” was correct, but could not
    identify the lying because of my disability and the fact I’d not been provided a
    working CD of the audio transcript of the hearing when I requested it because
    I could not work out what had happened if the judge said my “version” wasn’t
    correct, when I was sure I’d gotten the critical dates right, but I say things
    wrong a lot like I kept saying, “September,” at one point on March 8, when I
    meant to say “February.” But I didn’t make a mistake when I said the date of
    service of the amended complaint in violation of the stay.

    I should be recompensed in the amount of $30,000, the amount I wanted from
    the equity loan I was denied because of damage to my credit from this
    foreclosure done without due process nor accommodation under the ADA,
    Title II, as well as by allowing willful violation of the stay; I should be
    recompensed the $7,250 interest I paid to borrow additional money to cover
    liens and interest as well as sales price, all in my cashier’s check for $128,250
    which was refused for deposit for redemption by the clerks on February 27,
    2006, and because I was denied access to the race to redeem by my
    unaccommodated disability and total failure of notice as required by due
    process procedures; I should be recompensed threefold the $5,000 I paid to
    Tami Schneider, granted damages and restored as if improper orders in