Why-I-Am-In-Foreclosure

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SANTA FE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.,
Successor by merger to Bank United,
Plaintiff,
v.
Karen M. Kline,
Et. al.
Defendants.
                                                               No. D-101-CV-200400619
Karen M. Kline
Third Party Plaintiff
v.
City of Santa Fe, E. W. Sargent,
Manhattan Condominium Unit Owners’ Association,
Dorrie Deal, Robert Horestler, Robert Hunt, Linda Hunt,
Sole Two Crow, Ed Crocker, Accent Property Management,
Somers Law Firm, Shapiro and Meinhold, Wells Fargo,
Third Party Defendants,

COMES NOW Defendant pro se, Karen Kline, as Third Party Plaintiff, and amends the Complaint to read as
follows:

1. Plaintiff, Karen Kline, is a resident of Santa Fe County.

2. Defendant, the City of Santa Fe, is in Santa Fe County.

3. Defendant, E.W. Sargent, does business in Santa Fe County as a Realtor and the Broker of Santa Fe
Properties.

4. Defendant, Manhattan Condominium Unit Owners’ Association, is organized in Santa Fe County.

5. Defendant, Dorrie Deal, owns a condo at 729 W. Manhattan, Santa Fe, in Santa Fe County.

6. Defendant, Robert Hoerstler, owns a condo together with his wife, Dorrie Deal, at 729 W. Manhattan,
Santa Fe, in Santa Fe County.

7. Defendant, Robert Hunt, is a resident of Durango, Colorado but owns a condo at 729 W. Manhattan in
Santa Fe, Santa Fe County, in which he also resides.

8. Defendant, Linda Hunt is a resident of Durango, Colorado but owns with her husband a condo at 729 W.
Manhattan in Santa Fe, Santa Fe County, in which she also resides.

9. Defendant, Sole Two Crow, owns two condos at 729 W. Manhattan, Santa Fe, in Santa Fe County.

10. Defendant, Accent Property Management does business in Santa Fe County.

11. Defendant, Sommer Law firm is in Santa Fe County and has lawyers Karl Sommer and Kurt Somer.

12. Third party defendants Manhattan Condominium Unit Owners’ Association, Dorrie Deal, Robert
Horestler, Robert Hunt, Linda Hunt, and Sole Two Crow, by willfully and maliciously refusing to pay what
they owe have caused this foreclosure action.

13. The nature of this case is that I have a case for damages because my home, a condo, was permitted to
be built over a privy pit that was not disclosed to me and caused damage, and as a result I am in financial
hardship.

14. My health has been damaged by toxic fumes caused by the privy pit.

15. All the condo owners own the lot where the privy pit was located.

16. The condo association has a duty to take care of the common area.

17. The association officers have a duty to fulfill their offices and their failure to do so has hurt and
damaged me.

18. Somer Law Firm attorneys re-wrote the bylaws so that I was denied any say in my property, which has
harmed and damaged me.

19. The property management business has agreed to take care of the common areas, but it hasn’t, which
is damaging me.

20. Ed Crocker said that the pier he installed was compromised due to where it was placed.

21. Wells Fargo mismanaged my money in several transactions impacting this foreclosure.

22. During my bankruptcy the Shapiro and Meinhold lawyer lied to me about liability of her client, this lie
has impacted my ability to fulfill my plan and attain the financial security meant to be provided by chapter ll.

WHEREFORE damages should be awarded me to remedy the injuries and damages I am suffering, and
costs should be awarded to me.

               Karen Marie Kline
               3255 Calle de Molina, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87507     (505) 471-2367

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed on September 23, 2004, to:
Sharon Hankla and Kelly J. McMullen @ Shapiro & Meinhold
13725 Struthers Road, CO 80921
800/286-0013; 719/634-4868

Manhattan Condominium Unit Owner’s Association, 729 W. Manhattan Unit # 2, Santa Fe, NM 87501
Address of Registered Agent, Robert Hunt

Dorrie Deal, 729 W. Manhattan Unit # 1, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Robert Hoerstler, 729 W. Manhattan Unit # 1, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Robert Hunt, 729 W. Manhattan Unit # 2, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Linda Hunt, 729 W. Manhattan Unit # 2, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Sole Two Crow, 729 W. Manhattan Units # 4 and 5, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Because I don’t have enough money for all of the service and copies until after I get next month’s rent,
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing will be mailed on October 4, 2004, to:

City of Santa Fe, 200 Lincoln Ave., Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

E.W. Sargent, 1000 Paseo de Peralta, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Ed Crocker, 227 E. Palace, Suite O, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Accent Property Management, 1050 Paseo de Peralta, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Sommer Law Firm, 200 W. Marcy, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501

Wells Fargo, Secretary of State for the State of New Mexico, 325 Don Gaspar, Suite 300

A. I filed case number D-0101-CV-2003-01530 for injunctive relief on August 21, 2003; on or about
that same time, Defendant Hunt threatened me saying, “We’re going to get you.” Also,
Defendants/Board of Directors refused to pay, and still refuse, what they owe on the excavation of
the privy pit located in the Manhattan Condominium lot which is a common element owned by all
Manhattan Condominium owners. Exhibit A.

B. If the injunctive relief for which I petitioned had been granted and Defendants had to seek Court
approval to buy condominium common elements’ things prior to paying privy pit costs, Exhibits B –
E, I would not be in foreclosure nor have tinnitus from unbearable stress when PNM was going to
disconnect my electricity, Exhibit F, because of my extreme poverty, which poverty is a result of the
Defendants’ lack of good faith and breach of their duties which are clearly defined in the
Condominium Act, Declaration filed March 12, 1984, and Revised and Restated Bylaws of 2000.

C. In relation to PNM: without electricity I don’t have balance because I need light to have balance,
so the chances of me falling at night were astronomically high and scared me, and I was so scared
that I got this tinnitus which has returned with a vengeance each and every time I am under extreme
stress.

D. In defense of my narrative style: the object here is justice and while my pleading may not be
stated with the skill of an attorney, it does give facts and explain what is needed and it should not be
ignored. “The Rules of Civil Procedure reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which
one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome; the purpose of pleadings is to facilitate a
proper decision on the merits.” Hambaugh v. Peoples, 75 N.M. 144, 401 P.2d 777 (1963).

E. By refusing to grant any restraining order for which I petitioned in August 2003, the Court
allowed the Defendants to perfect their threat to “get” me. It appears, however, from inspection of
the Exhibits presented to the Court, that Defendants misled the Court in relation to the location of the
privy pit. On “Defendant’s (sic) Exhibit A”, my Exhibit Aa, an arrow is falsely drawn to show that
the excavation was entirely under my unit, whereas the truth is that it was in the open common
element area as well, as shown in my Exhibit A, labeled in red. It is also important to note that at that
time the Court was refusing to grant me special accommodation of my disability with the result that I
was not able to present my case and be heard in court. Because of that fact and the fact that my
disability is precisely such that without special accommodation I do not have the ability to proceed
and be heard, I will include throughout this part of my Amended Complaint integral mentions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II, (“ADA, Title II”), which was passed by Congress to protect
all disabled Americans such as myself, and governing case law referring to it.

F. It is the case that I am suffering the extreme effects of Defendants’ threat as they have daily
“gotten me” by financial means: they have willfully and caused my properties to go into foreclosure
by willful dereliction of their legal duty as set out in the Condominium Act, Declaration, and Revised
and Restated Bylaws. At the same time, and showing bad faith, they have spent on extraneous
common element things an amount of money several times that they are required by law to pay to
remedy the privy pit located in the Manhattan Condominium lot, and I will show this.

1. After the IRS put me out of business in 1994 by collecting penalties and interest assessed on
amounts I had paid, see www.health-boundaries-bite.com/1984Levy.html, my financial situation was
tight. In 1995 I rented my condo to an artist who was paying me excellent rent, the most I had ever
received. When he complained that Sole Two Crow, who owns two condos, had a dog that barked all
the time, I asked Sole to keep her dog from barking, but she did nothing and at the same time Linda
Wolff, who also owned two condos (there are five in total), kept asking me if my tenant was gay, so

that I formed the opinion that she thought he was and objected. I wrote to Sole and Linda and the
association explaining my desperate situation and asking them please to quiet the dog and not drive out
my tenant who I absolutely needed for income. They did nothing. My tenant left and left my condo a
disaster so that it took me over a month to clean – I could not afford to hire help. Later I sued them
for interference with contract, only I didn’t write the case, Dean Johnson did – he was a man who
told me he was an LLM tax attorney, when he wasn’t an attorney; he found many unscrupulous
ways to get money from me, like writing cases which I paid him for and he then abandoned, and
telling me cubic zirconium was diamond so that I lent him significant money on his fraudulent
representations, on and on... he tried to get my property, too.

2. Because the interference with contract case was based on the Condominium Act, eventually the
insurance company settled for the Defendants, paying me the amount that was lost on my
lease/contract.

3. Thereafter Linda Wolff and Sole Two Crow appeared angry and rewrote the Bylaws to keep me
from participating or having grounds to sue them again if they failed to perform in similar ways.

4. I did not agree to the Revised and Restated Bylaws which were approved by the Corporation
Commission on February 12, 1999. The approval date was a month and a half after December 25,
1998, when my vitamin B12 illness was diagnosed and I was taught to give myself regular shots. The
regular shots helped, but did not totally restore my cognitive function, nor were they in time to
prevent serious cognitive dysfunction during the time I could have fought the changes had I been able
minded.

5. Significantly, low B12 is known to cause nerve damage and permanent nerve damage if it is not
timely treated: www.health-boundaries-bite.com/Fingernails.html . I made B12 web pages because
my cognitive dysfunction could have been prevented at a cost of $14 a year for injectable cobalamin
and I want people to be aware. I tried to sue, but without accommodation to my disability, it was
impossible to prosecute.

6. Had I received the therapy and compensation technique training in 1999 that I have received since
2003, through the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, I believe I could have successfully
demanded my rights in relation to the Bylaws. But, I had not and therefore could not.

7. It was clear to observers that I was not tracking in a competent manner. It is also the case that the
Condominium Act at 47-7A-12(A),(B)(2); 47-7A-12; and 47-7A-14 applied:

Regarding punitive damages, the Revised and Restated Bylaws violate the automatic stay, 11 USC
§362 (a)(3)(4)(5)(6)(c)(1), that was in place in my Chapter 11 bankruptcy, by requiring me to pay
pre-bankruptcy debt to participate in the Association. Damages are mandatory for willful violation of
the automatic stay, 11 USC §362(h), to include punitive damages. I didn’t recognize this violation at
the time for reasons previously explained.

8. I will incorporate at this point a recent event which is significant: the Court on July 30, 2004, after
denying me accommodations to my disability, said I appeared incompetent and the Court initially ruled
that because I was incompetent I could not file any other suit ever again; that Order was not entered,
however, because I objected saying that the Court did not have jurisdiction to supplant the ADA, Title
II. I mention this because I want to make clear that my disability is evident, particularly when I am
without accommodation. I had no accommodation when the Manhattan Condominium Unit Owners
Association was and is taking advantage of me in bad faith and in violation of the Condominium Act,
specifically 47-7A-12(B)(2) quoted above.

9. Back to the rest of this pleading:

10. Significantly, the first two people to sign the Revised and Restated Bylaws were Linda Wolff and
Jeff Lewis, Exhibit 1, a creditor of mine who blamed his attorney for his violations of the automatic
stay that were so egregious, like ignoring the Appeals Court, that I could see them; his attorney’s
insurance settled when Paul Fish facilitated the settlement conference arranged by Judge McFeeley of
the bankruptcy court.

11. Following the Bylaws rewrite, Linda Wolff sold one of her condos to Defendant Deal and the
other to Defendant Hunt; officers and directors were elected without notice to me of meetings or
nominations and I had no opportunity to participate. At that time I was, as I have said, in Chapter 11
as a result of IRS errors and interference with contract; I paid each and every post-filing condo fee
on time as part of my Chapter 11 obligations under a Drop Dead Clause which scared me very much
and I absolutely fulfilled.

12. Each time that they failed to notice me of meetings or allow me to participate because I had an
unpaid lien, they were in violation of the automatic stay. The automatic stay exists precisely to ensure
that after filing bankruptcy and having an accepted plan, I am restored, but when this type of violation
takes place, I cannot be restored because my situation has been illegally made worse, as this case
illustrates.

13. In late 1999 or early 2000, Defendant Deal, who had been elected as a Director and Treasurer,
but without me being allowed to participate, failed to notice me of property tax assessments. Because
of severe roof problems, the roof wood was rotted through, I did not believe that my condo was
valued correctly because it needed so much work that it was not at all the same value as the other
condos.

14. I can’t attach the letters I wrote to Defendants Deal and the association about the failure to pass
on to me the assessments because my Mac computer won’t stay on long enough for me to find them.

15. Hoping to compensate for my malfunctioning computer, I called the County Assessor’s office on
September 8, 2004, and ascertained that the failure to pass assessments on to me was before
February 1, 2000, based on the fact that on that date the condos were changed to individual
assessment status.

16. Prior to the status change, Defendant Deal had been telling me that I had not set up the property
taxation accounts properly. However, in my several recent readings of the Condominium Act I see
that I had done it properly in terms of the original election:

The operative word is “elect”. Defendant Deal wanted to change the election, which is fine. But to tell
me I did it wrong, was false and abusive; the fact is that she had failed in her duty to know the value
of my unit, contest the inaccurate higher valuation and promptly notify me as the unit owner.

17. A year later, in 2001, I was fulfilling my Chapter 11 Plan, which plan I had because the
bankruptcy judge, Mark McFeeley, organized both a settlement hearing and a disinterested lawyer,
Paul Fish, to facilitate the various settlements. One of the opposing attorneys, Daniel Behles, wrote up
the plan because I had been unable to do it: each time I had tried it was just very confused. Part of the
agreed plan was to refinance my condo and use the proceeds to pay creditors. So I refinanced, but
when I went to closing on April 26, 2001, the amount I got was not what I had been counting on
because $923.20 had been taken out to pay city sewer and garbage, Exhibit 2 (consisting of 2 pages).
I feared that this was a result of the City retaliating because I had filed and won a violation of
automatic stay proceeding against it. I called Defendant Deal and left several messages, but Defendant
Deal did not call me back which is typical of how she has consistently treated me.

18. The fact was revealed that Defendant Deal, a Director and Treasurer, had neglected and failed to
pay City sewer and garbage for ten months in dereliction of her duty, see 4/30/01 bank statement,
Exhibit 3, and City of Santa Fe Receipt of May 17, 2001, Exhibit 2a. The receipt shows that an
amount totaling $923.20, was paid by Manhattan Condo Assoc., presumably Defendant Deal, on May
17, 2001.

19. After the problem with the $923.20 and before I got my money, I didn’t feel a cord due to
impaired sensation: living in the condo with the hydrogen sulfide from the hidden privy pit: www.
health-boundaries-bite.com/Old-Outhouse-Pit.html, my feet often went numb from the hydrogen
sulfide affecting my nerves which were already impaired from extended low B12 (since I moved
from my condo, the numbness happens less frequently) and I fell and hit my head. When I saw the
x-ray records from my fall in my medical file it was as if someone had fabricated them because I
have no memory of going and having the x-rays.

20. After Defendant Deal paid the long overdue bills on May 17, 2001, and I got my $923.20 back, I
told her that she had caused me serious problems which were made worse by the fact I lost my job
on July 14, 2001, as a result of my injury. Subsequently, 9/11 happened and I couldn’t get another
job.

21. Defendant Deal together with Defendant Hunt who was also a Director and who had been elected
President without notice to me so that I could participate, said the problem was that I had not been
paying my condo fees and so of course the title company would take that money out.

22. That was completely false. I had been faithfully paying every single month. Only after the failure
of Defendant Deal to pay the sewer and garbage out of my and the other paid condo fees, and after
my fall, brain injury and loss of my job, did I not have the money to continue to pay the condo fees.

23. So, I asked Defendants Deal and Hunt, Treasurer and President respectively, as well as
Directors, for consideration given the failure to pay city sewer and garbage which Deal, as Treasurer,
should have been paying. They responded by putting a lien on my property for the condo fees and by
continuing to falsely maintain that the reason the $923.20 had been taken from my closing was my
failure to pay my fees.

24. The facts related above show a pattern of dereliction of duty.

25. In relation to the current dereliction of duty regarding the privy pit located in the Condominium
lot which is a common element, the proportions are so dramatic that my well being has been not only
threatened, but had been destroyed in large part. I hope I can make this clear.

26. I live below poverty level as a result of the failure of unit owners who are association directors to
pay their share of common element costs.

27. Defendants to whom this amendment to complaint applies have not paid one single penny of their
share of the common element costs related to the privy pit.

28. My poverty is such that after I pay essential bills each month, I have about $11 a week left. I am
not eligible for food stamps because I own property. Spaghetti at 50 cents a lb. is the cheapest thing
to eat. I am constantly hungry because I can’t afford what my body needs, like protein. No matter
how much spaghetti I eat, my body is not less hungry and I gain weight. It is for that reason that I
need to gather fruit from local apricot trees, which the owners themselves do not collect but

rather let fall to the sidewalk, and from grape vines that are equally unpicked by the owners. I had
frozen much of this fruit to use in the winter, but then my fridge stopped working and I was afraid it
would stop again, so I began eating the fruit, day by day. So now, I don’t have the winter supply I
had worked so hard to have, because I didn’t have the money to have my fridge mended, and I
couldn’t take the chance that it would permanently fail, rather than continuing to periodically fail, with
the result that I would lose all the fruit because it would no longer be preserved by freezing.

29. Anxiety is a part of my daily life because of the extreme poverty into which I have been forced
by the Defendants refusing to pay their share of the common element costs related to the privy pit
excavation.

30. The Defendants have willfully and maliciously caused my poverty, foreclosures, extreme distress
and anxiety and other damages because without question they have a legal duty to pay for the
excavation and repairs necessitated by the privy pit in the condominium lot which by definition is a
common element and not a limited common element: 47-7A-3(D) and (P), and 47-7B-2(B) and (D) of
the Condominium Act:

Since the condominium lot is not listed among the possible limited common elements, it is by

definition not a limited common element based on the rule of statute construction whereby the
expression of one thing excludes others. In this case, the list of limited common elements does not
include the lot, and therefore the lot is excluded from being a limited common element.

31. Because The Condominium Act at 47-7B-2 also says, “Except as provided by the declaration:” I
will copy here the relevant portion of the Declaration filed on March 12, 1984:

Declaration Section 2.3. “Unit Boundaries. Each Unit consists of the space within the following
boundaries: ... (2) Lower Boundary: the horizontal plane of the top surface of the undecorated
floor.”

32. The above language from the Declaration shows that I alone did not own the privy pit that was
located in the lot under my bedroom and in the common area adjacent to the driveway.

33. Without question the Defendants are in dereliction of their duty and are therefore willfully and
maliciously causing damage which could have been prevented but that they threatened to harm me
and now they are doing just what they threatened to do, that is harming me by refusing to pay what
they owe while at the same time they spend huge amounts on pleasurable improvements for
themselves, some of which are shown in Exhibits B-D, for which in many cases they assess me.

34. The Condominium Act clearly deals with maintenance:

The Condominium Declaration for Manhattan Condominium filed March 12, 1984, states:

Section 2.4. “Maintenance Responsibilities.
Notwithstanding the ownership of various portions of the Common Elements and the Units by virtue
of the foregoing boundary description, the provisions of the Bylaws shall govern the division of
maintenance and repair responsibilities between the Unit Owner and the Association.”

The Revised and Restated Bylaws of 1999, state:

Article V, Section 5. Maintenance, Repair, Replacement, and Other Common Expenses.

a. By the Board of Directors.

The Board of Directors shall be responsible for the maintenance, repair, and replacement (unless, if in
the opinion of not less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Board of Directors such expense was necessitated
by the negligence, misuse, or neglect of a Unit Owner) of all of the Common Elements, but not the
Limited Common Elements, as defined herein or in the Declaration, the cost of repair of the Common
Elements shall be charged to all Unit Owners as a Common Expense;
provided, however, that Unit Owner shall perform all repair, replacement, and maintenance on the
Limited Common Elements appurtenant to this Unit and any portion of the remaining Common
Elements which the Board of Directors pursuant to the rules and Regulations has given him
permission to utilize, including, without limitation, the items enumerated in subsection b. hereof.

The Declaration does not specifically define Limited Common Elements, but rather states:
Section 1.2. Defined Terms. Terms not otherwise defined herein or in the plats, plans, or Bylaws
shall have the meanings specified in Section 2 of the Condominium Act.

35. As a matter of fact, my clean out was used for quarterly to bi-annual Roto-Rooting to keep the
sewer from backing up into all the units until it no longer connected to the city sewer. After its repair
in conjunction with the privy pit excavation, I wrote on September 16, 2003, that to use it they must
pay their shares, Exhibit 4; They decided to get a new sewer pipe at a cost of $6,000+/- instead of
paying their shares., Exhibit 5 & Exhibit 6; which shows extreme prejudice and malicious intent.

36. In relation to the legal aspects of this, the Condominium Act says”

37. The foregoing portions of the Condominium Act are not discussed individually because I do not
have enough time to complete that part of this task. In order to do that I would need another week or
two. However, if I were to have to appeal this, I would not be able to mention anything I haven’t
presented to the trial court, so I believe I need to mention these things in case they turn out to be
important.

38. Significantly, the Defendants have caused me to lose an entire year’s rent from my larger rental
because when they failed and refused to pay their share of the common element costs of the

privy pit excavation, I did not have the money to pay sewer and garbage on my rental and the City
threatened to turn off the water which caused me tenants to tell me they had to move as a result.
Later my tenants said they moved for other reasons, but I could not rent my rental when it was
without water. The amount I have lost in rent, to today’s date of September 22, 2004, is $16,200.

39. At the same time, the Defendants refused to contact the insurance company about a possible
second privy pit under the door to my bedroom in my condo, where the bricks began to sink.
Whether because of more toxic fumes, or because of the Defendants’ toxic attitude and behaviour
toward me, I became very sick at the condo and eventually my doctor told me I had to move away
from the toxins, at which point I moved into my rental where the water had to be turned on again
because my doctor wrote the water company a note dated 10/30/03, Exhibit 7, regarding the
necessity.

40. Another damage is that Defendants’ failure and refusal to pay what they owe caused my credit to
be ruined thereby prohibiting me from refinancing at the very favorable rates which were at 20 and 30
year lows. The difference between 8.25 percent interest and 5.25 percent interest which but for the
destruction of my credit I could have had, is a difference of about $200 a month, which over 30
years is a damage of about $72,000 on the Wells Fargo mortgage, and about $24,000 on the
Washington Mutual mortgage.

41. The destruction of my credit which had just been rehabilitated, has cost me several thousands of
dollars in other similar but different ways.

1. The ADA, Title II, provides that “no qualified individual with a disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. §12132.

2. As a person with brain damage who meets the essential eligibility requirements of the Department
of Vocational Rehabilitation and the Traumatic Brain Injury Program, I am qualified under the ADA
and rely on the ADA, Title II, in its provisions.

3. My reliance in court on the ADA, Title II, was supported by the United States Supreme Court’s
Opinion in Tennessee v. Lane, handed down on May 17, 2004.

4. In Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court talks about discrimination in courts, saying that
Congress’s “appointed task force heard numerous examples of the exclusion of persons with
disabilities from state judicial services and programs, including exclusion of persons with visual
impairments and hearing impairments from jury service, failure of state and local governments to
provide interpretive services for the hearing impaired, failure to permit the testimony of adults with
developmental disabilities in abuse cases, and failure to make courtrooms accessible to witnesses with
physical disabilities.”

5. Because of my disability, I require and am entitled to special accommodations by the court, to
include hearings being set when my case manager can accompany me to court, more time to
respond, a slower pace in court which includes setting hearings that are longer in order to allow me
the extra time I need, clearly identified questions/topics as on notices of hearing, and clearly identified
procedures which includes not changing which rules will be followed when other than the obvious
rules may pertain, or, alternatively, identifying to me what other than the obvious rules are going to be
used, allowing me to read what I have prepared because I cannot just say what I need to say and I
have a right to be heard, and additional time to respond due to my measured impairments in
processing speed, as well as the tapes of the hearings being provided to me free of charge as a
reasonable and special accommodation.

6. “Title II, §§12131-12134, prohibits any public entity from discriminating against “qualified”
persons with disabilities in the provision or operation of public services, programs, or activities. The
Act defines the term “public entity” to include state and local governments, as well as their agencies
and instrumentalities. §12131(1). A disabled person is considered ‘qualified’ if that person ‘meets the
essential eligibility requirements’ for the receipt of the entity’s services or participation in the entity’s
programs, ‘with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of
architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and

services.’ §12131(2). Title II’s enforcement provision incorporates by reference §505 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 92 Stat. 2982, as added, 29 U. S. C. §794a, which authorizes private
citizens to bring suits for money damages. 42 U. S. C. §12133.” Tennessee v. Lane, 124 SCt 1978
(2004).

7. “The ADA’s findings make clear that Congress believed it was attacking ‘discrimination’ in all
areas of public services, as well as the ‘discriminatory effect’ of ‘architectural, transportation, and
communication barriers.’ §§121011(a)(3), (a)(5),” Ibid.; “Central to the Act’s primary objective,
Congress extended the statute’s range to reach all government activities, §12132 (Title II), and
required “reasonable modifications to [public actors’] rules, policies, or practices,” §§12131(2)-12132
(Title II). See also §12112(b)(5) (defining discrimination to include the failure to provide “reasonable
accommodations”) (Title I),” Ibid.; Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer
joined, concurring, wrote in Tennessee v. Lane, “Legislation calling upon all government actors to
respect the dignity of individuals with disabilities is entirely compatible with our Constitution's
commitment to federalism, properly conceived.” (I added the bold to support the propriety of filing
my ADA case complaining about denial of due process: the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Board of
Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356 that the Eleventh Amendment bars private money
damages actions for state violations of ADA Title I, which prohibits employment discrimination
against the disabled. The en banc Sixth Circuit then issued its Popovich decision, in which it
interpreted Garrett to bar private ADA suits against States based on equal protection principles, but
not those relying on due process, and therefore permitted a Title II damages action to proceed despite
the State's immunity claim..)

8. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on May 17, 2004, in Tennessee v. Lane, “In sum, Title II requires,
on pain of money damages, special accommodations for disabled persons in virtually every interaction
they have with the State.”

End of Amendment in relation to Defendants in the Title of this pleading.

AMENDED THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT IN RELATION TO
DEFENDANTS MANHATTAN CONDOMINIUM UNIT OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION,
DORRIE DEAL, ROBERT HOERSTLER, ROBERT HUNT, LINDA HUNT AND SOLE TWO CROW

47-7A-12. Unconscionable agreement or term of contract.

A.     The court, upon finding as a matter of law that a contract or contract clause was
unconscionable at the time the contract was made, may refuse to enforce the contract,
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause or limit the
application of any unconscionable clause in order to avoid an unconscionable result.


B.     Whenever it is claimed, or appears to the court, that a contract or any contract
clause is or may be unconscionable, the parties, in order to aid the court in making the
determination, shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to
unconscionability, including:

(1)     the commercial setting of the negotiations;

(2)     whether a party has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of the other
party reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or mental infirmity,
illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the agreement or similar factors; and
(emphasis added)

(3)     the effect and purpose of the contract or clause.

47-7A-13. Obligation of good faith.

Every contract or duty governed by the Condominium Act [47-7A-1 to 47-7D-20 NMSA
1978] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.

47-7A-14. Remedies to be liberally administered.

A.     The remedies provided by the Condominium Act [47-7A-1 to 47-7D-20 NMSA
1978] shall be liberally administered in order that the aggrieved party is placed in as good
a position as if the other party had fully performed. However, consequential, special or
punitive damages shall not be awarded except as specifically provided in the
Condominium Act or by other law.

B.     Any right or obligation declared by the Condominium Act is enforceable by judicial
proceeding.

47-7A-5. Taxation.

A.     The association of unit owners shall elect whether:

(1)     the entire property shall be deemed a single parcel for the purposes of assessment
and taxation, in which event the association shall promptly notify the unit owners of the
payment of the taxes. For purposes of assessment or valuation and taxation under this
paragraph, the association shall be deemed to be the owner as defined in Section 7-35-2
NMSA 1978; or

(2)     each unit and its percentage of undivided interest in the common elements shall be
deemed to be a parcel and shall be subject to separate assessment and taxation by each
assessing unit and special district for all types of taxes authorized by law, including ad
valorem levies and special assessments.

47-7A-3(D). "common elements" means all portions of a condominium other than the
units;

47-7A-3(P). "limited common element" means a portion of the common elements
allocated by the declaration or by operation of Subsections B and D of Section 14
[47-7B-2 NMSA 1978] of the Condominium Act for the exclusive use of one or more
but fewer than all of the units;

47-7B-2 says:

(B). if any chute, flue, duct, wire, conduit, bearing wall, bearing column or any other
fixture lies partially within and partially outside the designated boundaries of a unit, any
portion thereof serving only that unit is a limited common element allocated solely to that
unit, and any portion thereof serving more than one unit or any portion of the common
elements is a part of the common elements;

(D). any shutters, awnings, window boxes, doorsteps or stoops and all exterior doors
and windows or other fixtures designed to serve a single unit, but located outside the
unit's boundaries, are limited common elements allocated exclusively to that unit;

47-7C-7. Upkeep of condominium.

A. Except to the extent provided by the declaration, Subsection B of this section or
Section 46 [47-7C-13 NMSA 1978] of the Condominium Act, the association is
responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements,
and each unit owner is responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of his unit.
Each unit owner shall afford to the association and the other unit owners, and to their
agents or employees, access through his unit reasonably necessary for those purposes. If
damage is inflicted on the common elements or on any unit through which access is
taken, the unit owner responsible for the damage, or the association if it is responsible, is
liable for the prompt repair thereof.

A. Except to the extent provided by the declaration, Subsection B of this section or
Section 46 [47-7C-13 NMSA 1978] of the Condominium Act, the association is
responsible for maintenance, repair and replacement of the common elements,

47-7A-8. Supplemental general principles of law applicable.

Except to the extent inconsistent with the Condominium Act [47-7A-1 to 47-7D-20
NMSA 1978], the principles of law and equity, including the law of corporations, the law
of real property and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, eminent
domain, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, receivership,
substantial performance or other validating or invalidating cause supplement the
provisions of that act.

47-7A-14. Remedies to be liberally administered.

A.     The remedies provided by the Condominium Act [47-7A-1 to 47-7D-20 NMSA
1978] shall be liberally administered in order that the aggrieved party is placed in as good
a position as if the other party had fully performed. However, consequential, special or
punitive damages shall not be awarded except as specifically provided in the
Condominium Act or by other law.

B.     Any right or obligation declared by the Condominium Act is enforceable by judicial
proceeding.

47-7C-3. Executive board members and officers.

A.     Except as provided in the declaration, the bylaws or other provisions of the
Condominium Act [47-7A-1 to 47-7D-20 NMSA 1978], the executive board may act in
all instances on behalf of the association. In the performance of their duties, the

officers and members of the executive board are required to exercise, if appointed by the
declarant, the care required of fiduciaries of the unit owners and, if elected by the unit
owners, ordinary and reasonable care.

B.     The executive board shall not act on behalf of the association to amend the
declaration, to terminate the condominium or to elect members of the executive board or
determine the qualifications, powers and duties or terms of office of executive board
members, but the executive board shall fill vacancies in its membership for the unexpired
portion of any term.

C.     Within thirty days after adoption of any proposed budget for the condominium, the
executive board shall provide a summary of the budget to all the unit owners, and shall
set a date for a meeting of the unit owners to consider ratification of the budget not less
than fourteen nor more than thirty days after mailing of the summary. Unless at that
meeting a majority of all the unit owners or any larger vote specified in the declaration
reject the budget, the budget is ratified, whether or not a quorum is present. In the event
the proposed budget is rejected, the periodic budget last ratified by the unit owners shall
be continued until such time as the unit owners ratify a subsequent budget proposed by
the executive board.

47-7C-8. Meetings.

A meeting of the association shall be held at least once each year. Special meetings of the
association may be called by the president, a majority of the executive board or by unit
owners having twenty percent, or any lower percentage specified in the bylaws, of the
votes in the association. Not less than ten days nor more than sixty days in advance of
any meeting, the secretary or other officer specified in the bylaws shall cause notice to
be hand-delivered or sent prepaid by United States mail to the mailing address of each
unit or to any other mailing address designated in writing by the unit owner. The notice
of any meeting shall state the time and place of the meeting and the items on the agenda,
including the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws,
any budget changes and any proposal to remove a director or officer.

47-7C-11. Tort and contract liability.

Neither the association nor any unit owner except the declarant is liable for that
declarant's torts in connection with any part of the condominium which that
declarant has the responsibility to maintain. Otherwise, any action alleging a
wrong done by the association shall be brought against the association and not
against any unit owner. If the wrong occurred during any period of declarant
control and the association gives the declarant reasonable notice of and an
opportunity to defend against the action, the declarant who then controlled the
association shall indemnify the association or any unit owner other than an
affiliate of the declarant for all judgments paid which are not covered by
insurance, which judgments resulted from a breach of control or other wrongful
act or omission on the part of the declarant. Whenever the declarant is liable
under this section, the declarant is also liable for all litigation expenses, including
reasonable attorney's fees. Any statute of limitation affecting the association's right of
indemnification under this section is tolled until the period of declarant control terminates.
A unit owner is not precluded from bringing an action contemplated by this section
because he is a unit owner or a member or officer of the association. Liens resulting
from judgments against the association are governed by Section 50 [47-7C-17 NMSA
1978] of the Condominium Act.

147-7C-15. Assessments for common expenses.

B.     Except for assessments under Subsections C, D and E of this section, all common
expenses shall be assessed against all the units in accordance with the allocations set
forth in the declaration pursuant to Subsection A of Section 19 [47-7B-7 NMSA 1978] of
the Condominium Act. Any past-due common expense assessment or installment thereof
bears interest at the rate established by the association not exceeding eighteen percent per
year.

C.     To the extent required by the declaration:    (Governed by ByLaws per Declaration;
comment added)

(1)     any common expense associated with the maintenance, repair or replacement of a
limited common element shall be assessed against the units to which that limited common
element is assigned, equally, or in any other proportion that the declaration provides;


(2)     any common expense or portion thereof benefiting fewer than all of the units shall
be assessed exclusively against the units benefited; and

(3)     the costs of insurance shall be assessed in proportion to risk and the costs of
utilities shall be assessed in proportion to usage.

D.     Assessments to pay a judgment against the association shall be made only against
the units in the condominium at the time the judgment was entered, in proportion to their
common expense liabilities.

E.     If any common expense is caused by the misconduct of any unit owner, the
association may assess that expense exclusively against his unit.

Notwithstanding the ownership of various portions of the Common Elements and the Units by virtue
of the foregoing boundary description, the provisions of the Bylaws shall govern the division of
maintenance and repair responsibilities between the Unit Owner and the Association.”

The Board of Directors shall be responsible for the maintenance, repair, and replacement (unless, if in
the opinion of not less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Board of Directors such expense was necessitated
by the negligence, misuse, or neglect of a Unit Owner) of all of the Common Elements, but not the
Limited Common Elements, as defined herein or in the Declaration, the cost of repair of the Common
Elements shall be charged to all Unit Owners as a Common Expense;

Background: The ADA, Title II

nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn

nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn

nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn
nnnnnnnnnnnnn