"RealLegal®, the market leader in technology to secure and transmit electronic transcripts, is keenly aware that court reporters need the same protection. Clearly, a transcript discovered to have been tampered with or inadvertently altered could have serious repercussions for a court case and for the reporters and other legal professionals involved. So when RealLegal designed its solutions for tamper-proof electronic court transcripts, it sought a partner that could help ensure the security of the information entrusted to court reporters. In 2000, RealLegal chose to partner with Surety, LLC, the leading provider of data integrity services to protect electronic records. Surety was experienced with e-discovery, enabling its customers to prove that their contracts, legal documents, and other records have the same if not better, legal defensibility as their paper counterparts. Surety’s AbsoluteProof® service became the security foundation of RealLegal E-Transcript Signatures™, allowing court reporters to digitally time-stamp their electronic transcripts to objectively demonstrate their time and content integrity. Today, E-Transcript Signatures are used by thousands of official court reporters, freelance court reporters, and court reporting firms nationwide, and the integration with AbsoluteProof enables them to meet the growing demand for electronic transcripts while avoiding the risks." It sounds like it deals with other forms than audio, so to speak.

Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial Independence under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980    That looks interesting, but I don't belong to an institution that subscribes to JSTOR. I would certainly like to see judges become accountable. This "absolute immunity" thing of theirs has gone far enough.

"Attorney Pangman appealed from the findings and conclusions that he engaged in professional misconduct by accusing a trial judge of having tampered with a court record by directing a court reporter to remove portions of the official transcript of a hearing and of otherwise intentionally interfering with his access to a complete hearing transcript for purposes of appeal and by making comments demeaning to the judicial system and engaging in disruptive conduct in a court proceeding. The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (Board) cross-appealed from the referee's conclusion that Attorney Pangman did not violate the attorney conduct rules by refusing to comply with several circuit court orders regarding the custody, placement and support of his children. By the remaining findings and conclusion, the referee determined that Attorney Pangman did not engage in professional misconduct by failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite the protracted litigation of the post-divorce matters. ¶2. On the basis of the facts properly found by the referee and the conclusions based on those facts, we determine that Attorney Pangman made statements concerning the integrity of a trial judge that were found to be false with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity, in violation of SCR 20:8.2(a) , when he accused the judge of having directed a court reporter to remove portions of an official hearing transcript and of otherwise obstructing the availability of a complete transcript, with the intention of "sanitizing" the record and interfering with Attorney Pangman's announced intention to seek appellate relief. Attorney Pangman also engaged in conduct with the intention of disrupting the court, in violation of SCR 20:3.5(c), and by that conduct and his statements in connection with it he failed to maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers, as required by the Attorney's Oath, SCR 40.15. As set forth in SCR 20:8.4(g), an attorney's violation of the Attorney's Oath constitutes professional misconduct. ¶3. As discipline for that professional misconduct, we suspend Attorney Pangman's license to practice law for a period of 90 days, not the minimum six-month period recommended by the referee. In doing so, we recognize the aggravating factors identified by the referee that were the basis for his recommendation of discipline more severe than the 90-day license suspension the Board had suggested was appropriate, but, as explained below, we consider mitigating factors that have not been addressed previously. Those aggravating factors concerned Attorney Pangman's demonstrated lack of respect for the judicial system and his outspoken contempt for it, as well as his deliberate refusal to abide by the obligations imposed upon him as a licensed member of the legal profession. ¶4. Attorney Pangman was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 1983 and practices in Waukesha. He has not been the subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding. The referee in this proceeding, Timothy Vocke, reserve judge, made findings of fact and conclusions of law following an evidentiary hearing." Well, if Pangman got disciplined for saying the judge had the transcript altered, I'm sure that means my chances of being able to prove it are reduced. I mean, who's going to risk there job to challenge a judge? In terms of the "conclusions properly found by the referee" - that reminds me that I complained about a judge and showed exactly where he broke the law and the Judicial Commission, I forget the proper name, said it didn't matter. I'll make a page to show that.

"Living this nightmare, I often ask myself what the motive might be that would cause a Blair County Court judge to alter public records and fabricate and destroy evidence of a judicial proceeding at the expense of a child's life. Why would he overlook the violent kidnapping of a child, the ensuing criminal conspiracy, judicial misconduct, systematic child abuse, CYS falsifying investigations, medical fraud, and fraudulently incarcerating a child in mental institutions?" If one judge has done this, then why not others? And why not, judges have "absolute immunity." You should read how far the U.S. Supreme Court allows that to go. If you're not shocked, you should be.

I find myself wondering as I read this, if a court would change a transcript, then would it be the right body to decide if a transcript had been changed? "The Petitioner also contends that tapes and transcripts of his interrogation were tampered with in that portions where Petitioner had asked for an attorney and had been threatened were eliminated from the tapes and transcripts. (D.I. 2 at 15-16). The Superior Court addressed this matter in relation to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Superior Court watched the tapes in their entirety and found nothing to suggest that portions of the tapes were erased. See Kirk, ID No. 9612002650-R1 at *3. Additionally, the court noted that Petitioner referred to blips in the tapes where police had allegedly erased Petitioner’s requests for an attorney and to cease the interview. The court found that no such blips were either visible or audible. Id. at *3 n.12. Again, the Court notes that the Superior Court rejected Petitioner’s claim as lacking any factual merit. The Court concludes that Petitioner has not rebutted this presumption of correctness. Therefore, the claim must be dismissed."

Authentication    1. Recognition testimony – a W may authenticate the object by testifying that the object is what the proponent claims it is.  901(b)(1)    2. Chain of Custody – if the evidence is of a type that is likely to be confused or can be easily tampered with, the proponent of the object must present evidence of chain of custody.  The proponent of the evidence must show that the object has been held in substantially unbroken chain of possession.  The proponent need not negate all possibilities of substitution or tampering, but must show adherence to some system of identification and custody.    3. You do not need a complete chain of custody, all you need is evidence sufficient to support a finding that the evidence is what it says it is.  A reasonable juror’s ability to find that.

The question is, if some judge has concealed evidence then how do we know any judge has not concealed evidence? Why wouldn't they, if judges are absolutely immune? Equally, why wouldn't they if a court says, as this one does, that changing the record doesn't matter, it doesn't show prejudice? "# Mrs. Doerman failed to follow this procedure.  She argues submitted evidence was omitted from the record, but did not provide a copy of this to the trial court in order to have the record corrected.  She argues comments made prior to the hearing were not transcribed, and part of a transcript contains "not audible."  Although only a small potion was inaudible, Mrs. Doerman failed to follow the proper procedure to supplement the record.  She further alleges in her brief that the judge concealed motions and transcripts and tampered with the file.  She also alleges that ex parte conversations were recorded and she can only clarify the record by calling the participants as witnesses. # At a hearing on July 17, 2001, the court discussed the various pending motions filed by Mrs. Doerman.  Mrs. Doerman wanted to have a hearing to review all of the problems with the transcripts.  The trial court discussed scheduling the hearing on September 5 and 6.  Mrs. Doerman argued that the court was depriving her of a hearing because she wanted the issue heard immediately.  She also argued that the September date would be too late for her appeal.  The record contains a notice that the hearing was later rescheduled to another date.  No further evidence is contained in the record before us regarding correction of the record. # It is Mrs. Doerman's responsibility to provide us with a record that is adequate to support any claimed errors.  Universal Bank v. McCafferty (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 556.  It is unclear if Mrs. Doerman's motion was specifically ruled on.  If the trial court denied or failed to rule on Mrs. Doerman's motions, she could have filed a motion before this court to have the record corrected. State ex rel. Hunter v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 88 Ohio St.3d 176, 177, 2000-Ohio-285. # Furthermore, we find that even if Mrs. Doerman had properly raised these issues, and the transcripts had been corrected to reflect the allegations in her brief, Mrs. Doerman's arguments still fail to evidence prejudice in the trial court's decision.  The failure to provide a complete transcript does not always deny an appellant an effective appeal.  State v. Nichols (Mar. 2, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 75605, 75606.   Many of Mrs. Doerman's arguments, including those regarding ex parte communications, are merely general assertions that the record is incomplete or incorrect, and do not demonstrate prejudice.  Any material alleged missing or incorrect must have been utilized by the trial court in making its decision.  See McGeorge v. McGeorge (May 22, 2001), Franklin App. No. 00AP-1151.  As such, this court finds the record before it is adequate for review.  See Nichols.  As previously mentioned, the trial court's decision discusses the evidence relied upon and Mr. Doerman's arguments, even if substantiated, would not change our determination that the decision was not an abuse of discretion.

Read this story and tell me, does it sound as if our judicial system is a joke? I copied the story because of the mention of tampering with transcripts. Yesterday, some enterprising ~Patriot evidently tried to distribute leaflets of the U.S. ~Constitution in the courthouse. You know, it's illegal to try to influence jurors, right? Anyway, the judge addressed the jury out loud in the courtroom, as follows: "Have any of you seen this? (She held up a copy of the pamphlet.) If you see one of these, you are to ignore the contents." Now I just heard that on the radio, so I may have a word or two wrong. But Nancy said this statement by the judge would have to appear on the court transcript. You will note the judge was careful not to say she was talking about the U.S. Constitution! Actually, I've read of cases where the transcripts of trials have been tampered with.

Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) The fact that it cannot be demonstrated how the delicate balance of an adjudication was tampered with, or whether it was, does not prove that it was not tampered with. To rely on the assumption that judges are men of fortitude and that no judge 'worthy of the name' would be influenced in his decision by a publication directed toward a particular disposition of a pending litigation, is to say in effect that the Due Process Clause precludes a State from believing that there may be such a psychological danger, short of the fantastic situation where a judge confesses that he decided as he did because of newspaper Page 331 U.S. 367 , 393 pressure, or avows that he came awfully close to being derelict in his judicial duty because of such pressure. In Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 159 A.L.R. 1346, this Court did not profess to make a constitutional dogma of so questionable a psychological assumption. It did not condemn outright the power of a State summarily to punish for contempt a publication uttered outside of court but brought to bear upon a pending case. The opinion of the Texas Court gives every indication of scrupulous obedience to the requirements of the Bridges case. Nor did the dissenting judge find conflict with the Bridges case. If we accord 'most respectful attention' to what the State court has decided, I am unable to find any ground for rejecting the application which the Texas Court made to the circumstances of this case of the principles which it drew from the Bridges case. Is it conceivable that even the most doctrinaire libertarian would think it consonant with the impartiality which adjudication presupposes to publish a poll regarding the outcome desired by a community in a pending case? How can the insertion into the scales of justice of a newspaper's own notion of the desire of a community for a particular result in a pending case be more permissible than the report of public feeling as ascertained by a public poll? Again, suppose the newspaper articles here in controversy had been enclosed in a letter to the judge urging, on the basis of these articles, a new trial. Would the Constitution of the United States forbid a State to deal with such conduct through the corrective process of contempt? But a denial of this power to the States where newspapers carry the same articles directed to the same end can only be on the basis that private correspondence has less constitutional protection than have newspapers. To agree with a principle in principle only to depart from it in practice has not been so fruitful of good in the Page 331 U.S. 367 , 394 world of diplomacy as to suggest its importation into the judicial process. If it be deemed that the Due Process Clause put an end to the historic power of States to allow summary proceedings for contempt by interference with an actually pending controversy, or even if it be deemed offensive to due process for the judge whose conduct is called in question to sit in judgment upon the contemnor because self-interest is too great, see Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 50 A.L.R. 1243, and Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539, 396, such a break with the past had best be completely candid. It may well be the deeper wisdom to treat with intelligent neglect paragraphs that are calculated and intended to influenc the dispo sition of litigation. But the wisdom of such wisdom is not the measure of the constitutional power of the several States to deal with extraneous influence designed to affect the outcome of a particular case. We think the judgment should be affirmed. Mr. Justice JACKSON (dissenting). This is one of those cases in which the reasons we give for our decision are more important to the development of the law than the decision itself. It seems to me that the Court is assigning two untenable, if not harmful reasons for its action. The first is that this newspaper publisher has done no wrong. I take it that we could not deny the right of the state to punish him if he had done wrong and I do not suppose we could say that the traditional remedy was an unconstitutional one. The right of the people to have a free press is a vital one, but so is the right to have a calm and fair trial free from outside pressures and influences. Every other right, including the right of a free press itself, may depend on the ability to get a judicial hearing as dispassionate Page 331 U.S. 367 , 395 and impartial as the weakness inherent in men will permit. I think this publisher passed beyond the legitimate use of press freedom and infringed the citizen's right to a calm and impartial trial. I do not think we can say that it is beyond the power of the state to exert safeguards against such interference with the course of trial as we have here. This was a private lawsuit between individuals. It involved an issue of no greater public importance than which of two claimants should be the tenant of the 'Playboy Cafe.' The public interest in the litigation was that dispassionate justice be done by the court and that it appear to be done. The publisher had a complete monopoly of newspaper publicity in that locality. For reasons that are not apparent, the papers took an unusual interest in the proceeding. They first made what the court agrees was a 'rather sketchy and one-sided report of a case.' This is not overstatement. The former tenant had tendered a check and the newspaper report represented it as a payment of rent; it made no reference to that fact that the check was postdated and was therefore no payment at all. Reports played up the fact that its favorite among the litigants was a veteran. The community became aroused. Then the newspaper published editorials which attacked the judge while a motion for retrial was pending with what the prevailing opinion concedes was 'strong language, intemperate language, and, we assume, an unfair criticism.' The object of the publicity appears to have been to get the judge to reverse himself and to grant a new trial. The fact that he did not yield to it does not prove that the attack was not an effective interference with the administration of justice. The judge was put in a position in which he either must appear to yield his judgment to public clamor or to defy public sentiment. The consequence of attacks may differ with the temperament of the

I finally found what I was looking for!     FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 901 (A) PROVIDES in general terms that the requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence is satisfied by proffered proof sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims it to be. A foundation for authentication of sound recordings was established in the federal courts in United States v. McKeever,*1* and upheld in cases such as United States v. McMillan.*2* In McMillan the court ruled that where a government agent testified that he heard the voice .of an informant at all times when he was making a recording of a telephone conversation, that this part of the conversation was accurate... WHEN AN AUDIO TAPE IS SUSPECTED OF HAVING BEEN TAMPERED with, it may be forwarded to a qualified forensic audio specialist for authentication. Prosecutors often request investigation of deficiencies in the previously mentioned process. Examples of such problems are: * Credibility questions relating to the tape recorder operator * Chain-of-custody contradictions * Differences between the content of the tape and testimony of what was said. Most often, however, a forensic expert is contacted when the tape is believed to have been altered or tampered with. Due to the nature of the allegations surrounding tampering issues, the examiner will requirements specific items from the party. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, has a protocol of required information, including: * The original tape * The tape recorders and related components used to produce the recording * Written records of any damage or maintenance done to the recorders, accessories and other submitted equipment * A derailed statement from the person or persons who made the recording, describing exactly how it was produced and the conditions that existed at the time, such as: 1. Power source, including a portable generator or drycell batteries; 2. Input, such as telephone, radio frequency transmitter/receiver, miniature microphone, etc.; 3. Environment, such as telephone transmission line, restaurant, apartment, street, etc.;4. Background noises, such as television, radio, unrelated conversations, computer games, etc.; 5. Foreground information, such as number of individuals involved in the conversation, general topics of discussion, closeness to microphone, etc.;6. Magnetic tape, such as brand, format, when purchased, whether previously used;7. Recorder operation, such as number of times turned on and off in the record mode, type of keyboard or remote operations for all known recorded events, use of voice-activated features, etc. * A typed transcript of the entire recording or, if that is not available, transcriptions of the portions in question. The items listed above are examples of what is required by a forensic expert as she begins an examination of questioned audio recordings Extraneous voices: background voices which at times appear to be as near as the primary voices (these can, at times, even block the primary voices)... FALSIFICATION OF TAPES A QUALIFIED FORENSIC EXPERT DETERMINES AUTHENTICATION by performing a number of scientific tests which detect evidence of tampering or falsification. The four basic types of tampering are these: * Deletion: the elimination of words or sounds by stopping the tape and over-recording unwanted areas * Obscuration: the mixing in of sounds of amplitude sufficient to mask waveform patterns which originally would show stops and starts in inappropriate places * Transformation: the rearranging of words to change con- tent or context * Synthesis: the adding of words or sounds by artificial means or impersonation. ELECTROMECHANICAL INDICATIONS OF FALSIFICATION THESE ARE SOMETIMES REFERRED TO AS "ANOMALIES" AND include the following: * Gaps: segments in a recording which represent unexplained changes in content or context (a gap can contain buzzing, humming or silence) * Transients: short, abrupt sounds exemplified by clicks, pops, etc. (transients may indicate tape splicing) * Fades: gradual loss of volume (fades can cause inaudibility and are considered gaps when the recording becomes fully inaudible) * Equipment sounds: inconsistencies of context caused by the recording equipment itself (common equipment sounds include hums, static, whistles, and varying pitches) DETECTING FALSIFICATIONS A FORENSIC EXPERT IS TRAINED to detect falsifications and to authenticate sound recordings. The expert correlates his observations of anomalies with machine functions to interpret events in the following ways. * Critical listening: this involves the use of human analytical capabilities to locate anomalies. The forensic expert listens with proper headphones to the original tape using high-quality analytical equipment. He first performs a preliminary overview of the original tape and notes events, including starts, stops, speed fluctuations, and other variations requiring further investigation. He then examines recorded events and categorizes them as environmental or non-environmental. After examining recorded events, the expert analyzes background sounds. He listens for abnormal changes, absences or the presence of environmental sound. The final phase of critical listening is an extensive audit of the foreground information. He concentrates on voices, conversations and other audible sounds. Here anomalies include sudden changes in a person's voice, abrupt unexplained topic change or strong foreground interruptions indicative of obscuration. The initial forensic process of critical listening provides foundation and direction for later intensive instrumental tests. * Physical inspection: the forensic expert next inspects for tampering with thorough visual inspection of the tape itself. She inspects the housing for pry marks, welding, size, label and date, consistent with the alleged recording date. She also measures the tape and assures that the splicing of the magnetic tape to the leader is consistent with a normal manufacturing process. Any other splices are noted as possible alterations. * Magnetic development: direct visual observation of the "developed" tape is conducted to find track widths, the type of recorder used and the presence or absence of residual speech signals. * Spectrum analysis: specialized computer equipment and programs to produce a visual interpretation of a frequency- versus-amplitude and frequency-versus-amplitude-versus-time displays. This allows the expert to view the entire spectrum or to zoom in on an area of particular interest thereby helping to characterize the acoustic quality of anomalies and identify their source. * Waveform analysis: a computer generated display representing time-versus-amplitude of recorded sounds in graphic form. With such analysis the expert can often measure signal return time, which reveals how long a recorder had been turned off. He can identify record- mode events, including the measurement of record-to- erase-head distance, determination of the spacing between gaps in multiple-gap erase heads and inspection of the signature shape and spacing of various record event signals. * Recorder performance: various electrical and mechanical measurements of standard and modified recorders for use in finding possible origins of buzz sounds, hum, etc. The expert who wrote the above, Steve Cain, has a website, with interesting pictures and text.

"From the April 2006 Idaho Observer: Judicial immunity writ reaches Supreme Court LAS VEGAS—Nevada attorney James Wray docketed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, specifically asking the U.S. Supreme Court to visit the topic of absolute judicial immunity, which allows judges to evade lawsuits even when their actions are intentionally and deliberately malicious, fraudulent and corrupt. Wray is hopeful that the petition, Wray v. Johnson (#05-1197), will spur the Supreme Court to overrule the doctrine of total judicial immunity.  Petitions for writ of certiorari are issued by a superior court to one of inferior jurisdiction to obtain and review the record of a particular case. "While the U.S. Supreme Court is not required to hear any such case presented to it, and because they grant only a very small portion of such petitions, we’re hopeful that a national outpouring of letters from the public to support this petition might encourage the court to hear the matter," Juli T. Star-Alexander, executive director of Redress, Inc, said. Redress, Inc., is a not-for-profit advocacy for those harmed by a legal system that Star-Alexander describes as "out of control.""

"Judges have long enjoyed absolute immunity from liability in damages for their judicial or adjudicatory acts, primarily in order to protect judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions by disgruntled litigants. Truly judicial acts, however, must be distinguished from the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may occasionally be assigned by law to perform. It is the nature of the function performed - adjudication - rather than the identity of the actor who performed it - a judge - that determines whether absolute immunity attaches to the act."  U.S. Supreme Court, Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988)

Martin v. Hendron, U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit (Findlaw asks for registration) "When Martin approached the bench unasked, the judge told her to sit down, twice.   She refused, and the judge sent for a police officer.  As Officer Hendren entered the courtroom, the judge ordered him to remove Martin.  Some struggle ensued, during which Martin was struck in the face by Hendren's arm or elbow.  Holding Martin in contempt, the judge ordered Hendren to "put the cuffs on her."  Martin tried to push Hendren away. Hendren then flipped Martin face down onto the floor, handcuffed her, pulled her to her feet by the handcuffs and her hair, and led her out of court.   Martin required ultrasound treatment for an injured shoulder. After this incident, Martin brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (1994), the Fourteenth Amendment, and state law, claiming excessive force and battery, and naming as defendants Hendren, John R. Gibbs, Hendren's supervisor Terry M. Luker, and the City of Gravette.  After the district court dismissed Gibbs as a misjoined party and transferred the case to the magistrate judge with the parties' consent, see 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c)(1) (1994), the remaining defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on Martin's Fourteenth Amendment claim and summary judgment on the rest.  The magistrate judge granted the City's and Luker's motions, but denied Hendren's, concluding Hendren is not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.  An order denying absolute immunity is immediately appealable, and we review the denial of absolute immunity de novo.  See Duty v. City of Springdale, Ark., 42 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)... "Judges are absolutely immune from suit for money damages when they act in their judicial capacity, unless their actions are "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Duty v. City of Springdale, Ark., 42 F.3d 460, at 462." The Duty case is often cited, but it is not a U.S. Supreme Court case, rather, it is from Arkansas. I'm sorry if that reminds me of former President Clinton, and not in a good way. If I, as a pro se party saw this case used against me in some other circuit I would object because the case is not available on the Internet as it would be if it were a U.S. Supreme Court case. Not that that will make a whit of difference. But, it should. It should be unlawful to use case law against a pro se party that is not readily available for the party to read. However, given the overwhelming prejudice against pro se parties, the objection will probably be disregarded, which is worse than being ruled against, since you can't appeal what isn't in writing.

This is interesting, though: Saucier v. Katz et al. 533 U.S. 194 (2000) "In a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, the requisites of a qualified immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence. Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive. Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526 (1985). The privilege is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Ibid. As a result, "we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U. S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)."

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9  (1991) "In this case, respondent Howard Waco, a Los Angeles County public defender, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against petitioner, Raymond Mireles, a judge of the California Superior Court, and two police officers, for damages arising from an incident in November 1989 at the Superior Court building in Van Nuys, Cal. Waco alleged that after he failed to appear for the initial call of Judge Mireles' morning calendar, the judge, "angered by the absence of attorneys from his courtroom," ordered the police officer defendants "to forcibly and with excessive force seize and bring plaintiff into his courtroom." App. to Pet. for Cert. B-3, , 7(a). The officers allegedly "by means of unreasonable force and violence seize[d] plaintiff and remove[d] him backwards" from another courtroom where he was waiting to appear, cursed him, and called him "vulgar and offensive names," then "without necessity slammed" him through the doors and swinging gates into Judge Mireles' courtroom. Id., at B-4, , 7(c). Judge Mireles, it was alleged, "knowingly and deliberately approved and ratified each of the aforedescribed acts" of the police officers. Ibid. Waco demanded general and punitive damages. Id..." "[O]ur cases make clear that the immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i. e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U. S., at 227-229; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 360. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id., at 356-357; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 351. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Judge Mireles' alleged actions were not taken in his judicial capacity. This Court in Stump made clear that "whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i. e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i. e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." 435 U. S., at 362. See also Forrester v. White, 484 U. S., at 227-229. A judge's direction to court officers to bring a person who is in the courthouse before him is a function normally performed by a judge. See generally Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 128, 177, 187 (West 1982 and Supp. 1991) (setting forth broad powers of state judges in the conduct of proceedings).2 Waco, who was called into the courtroom for purposes of a pending case, was dealing with Judge Mireles in the judge's judicial capacity. Of course, a judge's direction to police officers to carry out a judicial order with excessive force is not a "function normally performed by a judge." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 362. But if only the particular act in question were to be scrutinized, then any mistake of a judge in excess of his authority would become a "nonjudicial" act, because an improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally performed by a judge. If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge "will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error ... or was in excess of his authority." Id., at 356. See also Forrester v. White, 484 U. S., at 227 (a judicial act "does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice or corruption of motive"). Accordingly, as the language in Stump indicates, the relevant inquiry is the "nature" and "function" of the act, not the "act itself." 435 U. S., at 362. In other words, we look to the particular act's relation to a general function normally performed by a judge, in this case the function of directing police officers to bring counsel in a pending case before the court. Nor does the fact that Judge Mireles' order was carried out by police officers somehow transform his action from "judicial" to "executive" in character. As Forrester instructs, it is "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that inform[s] our immunity analysis." 484 U. S., at 229. A judge's direction to an executive officer to bring counsel before the court is no more executive in character than a judge's issuance of a warrant for an executive officer to search a home. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S. 478, 492 (1991) ("[T]he issuance of a search warrant is unquestionably a judicial act"). Because the Court of Appeals concluded that Judge Mireles did not act in his judicial capacity, the court did not reach the second part of the immunity inquiry: whether Judge Mireles' actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. We have little trouble concluding that they were not. If Judge Mireles authorized and ratified the police officers' use of excessive force, he acted in excess of his authority. But such an action-taken in the very aid of the judge's jurisdiction over a matter before him-cannot be said to have been taken in the absence of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.